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Following the devastating effect of the financial crisis, the securitization in Europe is still largely 
impaired and yet to get to the pre-crisis level. There are have been many regulatory interventions 
to revive the securitization market, with the latest being the regulation (EU) 2017/2402 that will 
be in force by January 2019. This thesis thus critically examines the regulation in the light of its 
ability to make a difference in European securitization, and possibly preventing another 
securitization-induced financial crisis. 
 
First, the rationale and motivations for securitization are highlighted, and possible drawbacks 
noted. In the same vein, the positives of having the regulation (EU) 2017/2402 are far reaching. 
For example, with the regulation coming to force, there is the expectation for more transparency, 
simplicity and standardization of securitization in Europe. The regulation (EU) 2017/2402, while 
replacing the laws on securitization in Europe, also creates the general framework for 
securitization and specific framework for simple, transparent and standardized (STS) 
securitization. The motivation for European securitizes to get the STS tag is that it makes them 
eligible for differentiated capital requirement of regulation (EU) 2017/2401. 
 
The benefits of the regulation (EU) 2017/2402, however, there are valid concerns about the 
overall impact on securitization in Europe. This thesis categorizes the concerns to two – sundry 
concerns and discrepancy concerns. The former relates to the general concerns about the 
regulation, while the latter expresses the concerns that show differences between what the 
regulation  seeks (as marketed by the authorities), and what is realistically available. 
 
The thesis finally concludes on the note that the European securitization market will be greatly 
impacted by the regulation (EU) 2017/2402 - there will hopefully be a lot of simplicity, 
transparency, and standardization or comparability, going forward. In addition, parties in 
securitization transactions now have more clearly defined roles, e.g. investors now have the 
responsibility of doing their due diligence before and after holding securitization positions, as 
well as originators and sponsors providing material information about securitization transactions. 
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This thesis discuses securitization, the latest financial crisis, and Regulation (EU) 2017/2402. The 
focus is about securitization in Europe1 and how Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 will plausibly fare in 
increasing European securitization, with the understanding of the role the securitization played in the 
financial crisis of 2008. In a way, securitization could be said to mean the process of making assets 
(those that have cash-generation ability) tradable on the capital market. In other words, simply 
explained, it means a process of transforming debts to sellable securities.  
In response to the financial crisis, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 
at the end of 2017, passed the general framework for securitization in Europe. The frame work entails 
elevating the process of securitization to be transparent, simple, and standardized.2 The regulation 
(EU) 2017/2402, coming into force by 2019, also doubles as an amendment to Directives 2009/65/EC, 
2009/138/EC and 2011/61/EU and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 648/2012. 
Therefore, this research touches on securitization in Europe, and how it is currently fairing, its link to 
the financial crisis, and the major themes and concerns of the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402. 
Specifically, an examination to the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 is considered in line with possible 
concerns that Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 may plausibly have. 
To be sure, securitization, up to some three decades ago, used to be predominantly an American 
financial transaction mode.3 Even after the financial crisis, securitization market is still bigger than 
the American corporate bond market. 4 It has evolved over time and its definition and usage have also 
be modified accordingly. Before now, the process of securitization used to be a more simplified 
arrangement of ‘’disintermediation’’ process. This means the process of replacing issuance of 
securities for a fresh debt financing, typically loans from bank.5 Nowadays, its usage are more 
profound and quite complex and complicated. Unfortunately, securitization is viewed as a less 
                                                          
1 References are made, however, to securitization outside Europe, where there is need for 
comparative analysis or for illustrative purposes. 
2 Regulations (EU) 2017/2401 and (EU) 2017/2402 are the latest regulations that covers the concept 
of securitizations that are simply, transparent, and standardized. They will both enter into force by 
January 2019. 
The acronym STS is duped for the securitization that will be simple, transparent and standardized, 
Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 
3 Theodore Baums (1996)  
4 Elena Loutsikina (2011)  
5 Frank J Fabozzi and Vinod Kothari (2008) 
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transparent and somewhat complicated process, hence Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, amongst other 
intents, aims to improve its opaque and complex nature by making securitizations simple, transparent 
and standardized.  
Securitization is designed as a risk transfer mechanism: transferring of risks from the banks to 
investors outside the banking sector, so as to spread the risks.6 Xudong et al7 define securitization has 
the system of pooling assets, normally by financial intermediaries, and repackaging and reselling such 
assets in a pool and collection of new assets. Used for different purposes, securitization implies a 
financial substitution arrangement where, for example, credit finance is repackaged as capital-market 
based finance.8  
The Association of Financial Markets in Europe explains Securitization as ‘’the pooling together of 
cash-generating assets, such as mortgages, auto loans or SME loans, created by banks and initially 
funded on their balance sheets, and funding these assets instead by issuing bonds in the capital 
markets.  These bonds are bought by a range of investors – typically banks’ treasury departments, 
insurance companies and a range of investment funds. The investors receive regular payments 
reflecting the interest and principal payments made by the underlying borrowers. Often, the bonds 
are divided into different tranches with different characteristics and varying levels of risk. The higher-
risk tranches yield a higher return for investors’’ 
Securitization, and the laws that have been enacted to improve its operations, is intended to facilitate 
capital market transactions, improve restructuring, and enable intra-group transactions.9 In turn, 
securitization has impacted the way banks play their roles in financial intermediation. Through 
securitization, banks role have moved from traditional banking to transactional banking, for 
example.10 The benefits of securitization regardless, it played a role in the latest financial crisis, 




                                                          
6 Viral V. Acharya, Philip Schnabel, and Gustavo Suarez (2013)  
7 Xudong An, Yongheng Deng, and Stuart A Gabriel (2009)  
8 Andreas A. Jobst (2003)  
9 Deloitte (2018) 
10 Deku and Kara (2017) 
11 European Parliamentary Research Service (2015) 
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1.1 Securitization Simplified  
 
In simplified terms, securitization is a form of structured finance where there is a pool of assets 
converted into one or more securities. It involves the redesigning of financial transaction to spread 
the risks among different people, typically varying classes of investors. So cash-generating assets that 
have similar features are pooled together. These assets, for example, can be mortgages, banks loans, 
car loans etc., so long they have similar features in their cash-generating characteristics. Typically, 
when these loans are granted to the customers, they are booked in the balance sheet of the bank, but 
these loans are thereafter converted as bonds and issued in the capital market12. The new conversion 
are referred to as asset-backed securities13. The issued bonds are purchased by investors who receive 
regular payments according to their investments. The periodic and regular payments to the investors 
comprises principal and interest payments and they are from the repayments made by the initial 
borrowers, i.e. the car loan and mortgage customers. The bonds are structured in tranches with 
different risk level, and the risk-reward relationship is accordingly arranged so that those with 
significant risk level are also compensated higher than the others. This means that a tranche that is 
risky will proportionally returns higher reward.  
A distinguishing feature of securitization from other forms of financing is that the pooled, newly 
generated cash flow can be structured into a higher credit quality. This is not characteristically 
common with other forms of structured finance. It can also acts as a finance technique where similar 
income-generating assets are pooled and thereafter sold to a third party, which in turn use them as 
collateral to insure securities that are sold in financial markets14. Securitization, as other structured 
finance products, has three features – ‘’ (1) pooling of assets (either cash-based or synthetically 
created); (2) tranching of liabilities that are backed by the asset pool (this property differentiates 
structured finance from traditional ‘’pass through’’ securitization); (3) de-linking of the credit risk of 
the collateralized asset pool from the credit risk of the originator, usually through use of a finite-lived, 
standalone special  purpose vehicle (SPV)’’. 15  
                                                          
12 AFME (2014) 
13 Frank J Fabozzi and Vinod Kothari (2008) 
14 European Parliamentary Research Service (2015) 
15 A direct quote from Frank J Fabozzi and Vinod Kothari (2008)  
The authors were referring to the definition of securitization from the explanation of the structured 




There are many parties to a typical securitization transaction, but the most active are ’’Original lender, 
the Originator, the Sponsor, the securitization Special Purpose Entity (or ‘issuer’), the Underwriter, 
the Credit Rating Agencies, the Third-party Credit Enhancers, the Swap counterparty, the Servicer, 
the Trustee, and the Investors’’.16  
These parties have clearly defined roles, but could have some element of overlap depending on the 
complexities of a particular securitization transaction. For example the Original lender typically is 
non-financial entity that has the underlying assets or exposures that needed to be securitized. The 
Sponsor on the other hand, is usually a financial institution that consolidates the securitization 
transaction by buying off the exposures from the Original lender. Depending on the structure of the 
securitization, the Originator also could be a financial institution, typical a bank, credit institution, or 
an insurance company. The Originator initiates the securitization transactions doing the pooling of 
income-generating assets and selling to the SPV17, or by just buying another party’s exposures and 
securitizing them. The Securitization Special Purpose Entity, sometimes interchangeably used for the 
SPV – the Special Purpose Vehicle, is usually a legal entity, with any form of corporate identities18 
and created for a specific reason of creating the securities and selling then in the market.  
The SSPE often turns out to be the issuer, based on its role in the securitization process. The 
Originator is separated, in principle, from creditors when the transfer is made to the SSPE. The 
separation or insulation of the SSPE from the creditors is necessary as it guarantees continue paying 
of obligation even in the case of insolvency. The underwriter acts as an intermediary in the process, 
typically between the SSPE and the investors, and usually as an investment bank. While acting as an 
intermediary, the underwriter in conjunction with rating agencies also analyzes the investors’ demand 
and the give general guidance in the overall structuring of the transaction. 
Explained in another simplified way, a securitization transaction can happen between lesser number 
of parties and in a less complicated manner. For example, a Bank grants a customer a mortgage, and 
the customer makes regular repayments which comprises the principal amount borrowed and the 
interest. At this point, the Bank is the Originator, and the owner of the asset. The mortgage is a cash-
generating asset, because the borrower makes regular payments to the bank. The Bank usually will 
have many customers that has been granted mortgage loans to and, being the owner of the assets, the 
                                                          
16 European Parliamentary Research Service (2015) 
17 The SPV means the Special Purpose Vehicle, also sometimes referred to as the SSPE, and as 
indicated already is usually the issuer of securitization. The SPV is referred to as the issuer because 
it is set-up for the special purpose of the particular securitization. 
18 It could be Limited Liability Company, a limited partnership, a trust, or even a corporation.  
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bank can pool similar mortgages together and sell off to another independent entity which has been 
formed for the sole aim of the securitization. This independent entity is the SPV. So, the SPV 
purchases the assets from the bank and pays through issuing of bonds to investors. The principal and 
the interest payment of the mortgage done by the initial borrower is technically towards the SPV, 
because the SPV now owns the assets. This example is illustrated in figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: A Basic securitization structure. Source: AMFE (2014 
 
To illustrate how securitization works, here is another example. Assuming a manufacturing outfit 
decides to sell its products on credit to a customer or group of customers, in this instance, the 
manufacturing company is the originator. Before granting the credit facility, the manufacturing outfit 
assesses the ability of the borrower to pay back, according to it set rules, referred to as underwriting 
standards. If the borrower is assessed to be credit-worthy, the loan arrangement is then created with 
specific details of repayment plan, including the duration and interest of the loan. Typically, the 
products or the assets sold on credit double as the collateral. If the originator (the manufacturing firm) 
needs money, he can sell assets (instead of borrowing) from the proceeds of the promised repayment 
plan. All he needs do is to set up a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) where he details, packages (in 
6 
 
tranches and classes) the collateralized loan into assets. He appoints a servicer who manages the 
repayment plan (the servicing of the loans) from the borrowers. The servicer may be from the 
manufacturing firm or a totally independent outfit. Thus the new, packaged securities often referred 
to as asset-backed obligations (ABO) are then offered to investors. 
1.2 Rationale and Motivation for Securitization 
 
While there are established economic advantages of securitization, prominent amongst them is 
reduced cost of lending19 (when compared to other structured finance). Other economic advantages 
include the ability to have comparative lower funding costs, seamless transfer and management 
corporate risks, diversification of funding source, relaxed capital requirement, procuring fee income, 
and ability to get a possible off-balance sheet funds. In addition, Loutskina20 submits that 
securitization surges the level of credit facilities, from financial institutions like banks, to other sectors 
of the economy.  
A well-structured and functioning securitization market acts as an investment avenue for financial 
institutions and investors. It is also a viable funding instrument to foster lending to banks and other 
investors. Securitization can as well acts as a medium to generate collateral for credit demands, by its 
ability to transform illiquid receivables and loans to more liquid assets21. The benefits can be viewed 
from the part of the lenders and originators, the investors, the market, and from social and economic 
point of view. 
First on the part of the lenders and originators 
Originators that also doubles as banks for example, can use securitization to upsurge their funding 
capacity, without necessarily breaching regulatory capital requirements. This is an advantage because 
while banks are required to maintain their capital in relation to type and size of their assets, they can 
actually use securitization to release those assets from their balance sheet, and lower the amount of 
capital that are tied to the capital-asset ratio. So through securitization, additional funding is made 
                                                          
19 Frank J Fabozzi and Vinod Kothari (2008)  
This is primarily viewed from the perspective of the lender. Fabozzi and Kothari opine that compared 
to other structured finance mechanisms, for example ‘factoring’, securitization is economic 
advantageous. For instance the receivables or the loaned articles which may not be acceptable for 
factoring may be acceptable for securitization. In addition, the cash flows form securitization are 
almost instant, while in factoring and other similar structured finance the proceeds are not received 
immediately.  
20 Elena Loutsikina (2011) 
21 European Central Bank and Bank of England (2014) 
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available. In addition, originators and original lenders can use securitization for the purpose of risk 
transfer. Here the initial risk associated to the fear that loans will not be serviced are transferred to 
the investors through securitization. Interest cost are reduced by de-linking the rating of the 
securitized products from their own original rating.22  
Furthermore, securitization affords alternative and additional funding options. Generally, banks can 
make do of securitization as an effective tool to of deleveraging23, particularly when the loans are 
non-performing24. In Europe for example, the aggregate amount of non-performing loans of the 
largest European banks, as at the end of 2016 is around half a trillion Euros (net), and the gross is 
around the same amount, totaling about a trillion Euros altogether. These non-performing loans can 
be repackaged and restructured for investors through securitization.25 Not only banks can benefit from 
the restructuring of legacy assets and non-performing loans, investment firms and credit institutions 
can use securitization to turn-around non-performing private equity and illiquid hedge fund 
investments. On the part of the central bank, securitization can be used to achieve target monetary 
and financial stability goals.26 Thus summarily, on the part of the ‘issuer’, securitization provides 
avenue for converting somewhat illiquid, individual financial assets into tradable, liquid instruments, 
diversify sources of funds, get lower and effective cost of funds27, and as well as freeing up the 
balance sheet off legacy assets with the attendant impressive and resultant financial ratios. 
Second on the part of the Investors 
Different classes of investors are reached through securitization. Since, there are classes of assets 
(with homogenous attributes) that are securitized, the needs of all types of investors are met, 
regardless the level of their risk-averseness and conservatism. It is also possible for securitization 
investments to be tailored to the specific tastes and desires of investors. A possible attraction for 
                                                          
22 European Parliamentary Research Service (2015) 
23 The general technique of reducing the level of indebtedness by selling assets. 
24 Deloitte (2018) 
Non-performing loans are those that the repayment are not forthcoming as expected or they are not 
serviced. 
25 Ibid 
26 European Central Bank and Bank of England (2014) 
‘’For example, In the current fragile macroeconomic environment, for example, high-quality ABS 
can support the transmission of accommodative monetary policy in conditions where the bank lending 
channel may otherwise be impaired. In particular, securitization may allow banks to lend without 
committing too much capital and other sources of funding, and thereby provide indirect market access 
to groups of borrowers that are otherwise not able to tap markets directly, such as SMEs’’ - ECB and 
BOE (2014) 
27 For example, through securitization, a security with higher rating can be securitized at a lower 
interest rate.  
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securitization is that, typically, securitization offers more returns on investment than government 
issued securities of similar maturities. For example, Treasury bill of 10 years pays less than a 
securitization transaction of similar duration. Often time, this could be as a result of the credit quality 
of underlying assets, or the sovereign backing of the State on the Treasury bill. Since securitization 
are referenced with popular bench mark rate, the LIBOR as an example, ‘ securitization can help meet 
investors’ demands for alternative spread-based investment product, while simultaneously serving 
basic investment goals of diversification and the risk reduction that may result’.28 More so, 
securitization utilizes various degrees and forms of investments, therefore investors can take 
advantage of the difference in the spread of their low funding costs and wider margins available in 
the market. This is also included in endless varieties and flexibilities unique payment preferences that 
investors can have. 
Third on the market 
When securitized assets are offered for investments, it establishes publicly available prices and 
information that are needed in improving the overall market practice. The publicly available 
information are useful in assessment, analyzing of otherwise complicated trade action.29 
Securitization also helps the credit institutions to have their risks transferred to the capital market 
specifically. So, the capital market provides additional investment chances investors with varying 
degree of investment tastes and wants, with differing asset diversification, risks and returns, and 
maturities, thus making investors to be exposed to mixed or unique investment opportunities in 
consumer finance, aviation, shipping, vehicles and auto services, real estates etc without possibly 
breaching any investment policies and restrictions.30 
Fourth on the Social and Economic benefits 
The benefits accruable to the specific parties, on the overall cascade to the society. As mentioned 
earlier, securitization can be used as a tool in achieving specific monetary policy goals. It increases 
the availability of funds, and reduces the cost of the fund from the primary to the secondary markets. 
Where there are alternative sources of funds, as securitization provides, more social programmes and 
policies can be influenced. For example, real estate securitization can be used to pursue housing 
                                                          
28 The Bond Market Association (1999). 
29 M. Levinson (2014) 
30 Deloitte (2018) 
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programmes, which in turn provide affordable housing that stimulate growth. Similarly, credit cards 
securitization can be used to promote availability and ease of acquiring consumer credits and loans.31 
However, good as securitization may seem, there are also some drawbacks. First, securitization 
challenges and weakens the banks’ conventional borrowing stance. This means that motivation for 
banks to borrow customers may have ulterior motive, particularly, as hinted above, it could be a 
chance for an off-balance sheet item, and if not properly monitored and regulated, could be a chance 
for unethical transaction. For example, an SPV may file for an involuntary bankruptcy in a 
securitization transaction just in a bid not fulfil its obligation. In another instance, as witnessed from 
the last financial crisis, there could be outright recklessness in the structure of the securitization. The 
drawback regardless, there are compelling economic reasons to have securitization, as its positive 
gains outweigh the drawbacks. 
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
 
The misuse of securitization played a significant role in the financial crisis, and particularly in the 
amplified the crisis. Consequently, the securitization market is greatly impaired. As part of the post 
crisis intervention, the latest Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 is made with the intent, amongst other 
reasons, to make the problems associated with securitization – opacity, complexity, and lack of 
standardization – reduced by introducing simple, transparent, and standardized securitization. This 
thesis therefore hopes, amidst other things, to be able to explain in simple terms the use of 
securitization and its various types and its connection of to the financial crisis. Also this thesis 
examines interventions from government organs in improving the securitization market in Europe, 
                                                          
31 The Bond Market Association (1999).  
‘’ Similarly, liquid and efficient secondary securitization markets can reduce geographical and 
regional disparities in the availability and cost of credit throughout a particular jurisdiction by linking 
local credit extension activities to national, and increasingly global, capital markets systems. It has 
also been observed that robust securitization markets facilitate and encourage the efficient allocation 
of capital by subjecting the credit-granting activities of individual financial institutions to the pricing 
and valuation discipline of the capital markets. In this fashion, securitization helps to promote the 
allocation of scarce societal capital to its most efficient uses. From a regulatory and financial markets 
supervisory perspective, securitization offers a useful mechanism by which financial institutions may 
shift concentrated credit, interest rate and market risks associated with their portfolio activities to 
investors and the more broadly dispersed capital markets, thus reducing risks to individual 
institutions, and systemic risks within financial systems.’’ - The Bond Market Association (1999) 
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and critically examines the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402. Thus specific research objectives of this 
paper include 
i) Are there connections between securitization, the EU crisis and the financial crisis? 
ii) What constitutes the key contents of the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 in relation to the STS 
eligibility criteria 
iii) What would be the implication of the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 to the securitization 
market in Europe? 






Understandably the area of this research is narrow compared to other mainstream financial regulation 
and as such, there may be relative dearth of research method and resources. However, I try to utilize 
the use of the legal dogmatics32, also sometimes referred to as the doctrinal method or black letter of 
the law.33 This is used by the review of the European Union (EU) statutory provisions, particularly 
Regulations (EU) 2017/2401 and (EU) 2017/2402. There is also brief touch on the Commission’s 
Guidelines, previously existing Directives on securitization, Capital Market Union and relevant EU 
agencies’ proposals, and Discussion Papers on securitization. I equally review main literature and 
scholarship on the subject of Securitization. However, there are limited court cases on the subject, 
therefore, as a limitation, the thesis lacks judicial inputs in the analysis. This is partly because the 
study is proactively assessing a regulation that will be in force by the start of January 2019. 
Nonetheless, hopefully, the analysis suffices in assessment of the Regulation 2017/2402. 
The thesis is limited to the areas of simple securitizations, in relation to the financial crisis and how 
the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 can either hopefully improve it or otherwise. There is no discussion 
about the mechanics of the calculation derivatives. The mathematical concepts of calculation of risks 
(for example, as provided in Regulation 2017/2401) are not discussed. Thus, the economics is not 
discussed, but the legal provision of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 is reviewed. Occasional and sparing 
allusion is made to the securitization process of other jurisdictions (for historical or comparison 
reason) but the EU is the crux of the thesis.  
The thesis combines Finance and law. On the one hand, the theoretical finance is explained in the 
light of the regulatory requirement. On the other hand, both are jointly reviewed as one indivisible 
whole. My intent is to use financial notion and argument (securitization) to the interpretation and 
systematization of legal rule (i.e. Regulation 2017/2402) to meet economic objective of how probably 
the regulation will be efficient. At some point comparative legal analysis is done (where for example, 
there is the comparison of the EU regulatory response to the financial crisis is compare to the US’) in 
                                                          
32 According to Pattaro E (2005), the use of specific legal method of systematically and analytically 
explaining the substance of a type of law. According to Aarnio (1997), it also involves the method of 
interpreting and systemizing legal rules. It may sometimes be loosely interchangeably used as 
‘analytical study of law’ or doctrinal study of law’. Pattaro E (2005). 
 
33 Mike McConville, Wing Hong Chui (2007), Introduction and Overview, in Mike McConville, 
Wing Hong Chui (Eds.) Research Methods of the Law (Edinburgh University Press Ltd ) 3,4; Khushal 




the thesis. Summarily, the thesis can be said to be pluralistic (in the sense of using more than one 
approach) in the research style. 
The first chapter introduces the reader to the thesis, where securitization is described and the rationale 
discussed, alongside research questions and structure of the thesis is explained. The second chapter 
discusses the subprime mortgage contracts and the EU and Financial crisis. Chapter three discusses 
the mechanics of securitization, where detailed accounts of types and techniques of securitization are 
explained. Chapter four discusses some provisions in EU legal acts concerning Securitization and 
policy response to the financial crisis. The fifth chapter discusses the Regulation 2017/2402 in details, 
and the sixth chapter discusses the concerns of the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 and, finally, the 
























2. Subprime Mortgage contracts, Financial Crisis and the EU crisis 
This chapter of the thesis provides background and context to the main arguments. So this chapter 
discusses mortgage contracts, the financial crisis, securitization and the EU crisis. The background 
information helps the arguments made about the merits and concerns Regulation (EU) 2017/2402. 
The choice of the themes in this chapter is deliberate, as they are intended to furnish the reader with 
introductory information to follow the arguments in subsequent chapters. On the one hand, subprime 
mortgage has a close connection to the financial crisis, and since Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 is about 
securitization in Europe, I believe it is somewhat beneficial to examine an EU-centric crisis (as a 
mirror of the financial crisis), and the details about the securitization techniques help the reader to 
appreciate the importance of the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402.  On the other hand, the interplay of 
these themes, I believe, is relevant to the thorough appreciation of the arguments of the thesis. 
There is an established strong link between subprime mortgage contracts, securitization and the 
financial crisis. The crux of the financial crisis can be traceable to poorly executed contracts, 
particularly mortgage contracts.34  The financial crisis and its attendant economic loss should open 
up possible review of contract law, especially where they affect commercial transactions. 
Predominantly, almost all stakeholders in the mortgage and financial industry – the borrowers, the 
lenders, policy makers and regulators – have a portion of blame for the financial crisis35.  
2.1 Mortgages Contracts  
All mortgage contracts, regardless if they are prime or subprime, have common semblance in their 
features and structure. Contracts are capable to regulating the relationships that subsist amongst 
parties. However, in the negative event of the financial crisis, it is not the inability of contracts to 
forestall a possible occurrence, but the misapplication (or sometimes outright neglect) of contract 
doctrines that incapacitated the prevention of the crisis.36 Specifically, subprime lending began as a 
direct consequence of the deregulation of the interest rates processes. After the development of 
policies and procedures that replace the traditional lending products, subprime lending evolved. 37 In 
addition, the growth and expansion of subprime lending and mortgage is attributable to technological 
innovations in the computation of complex financial pricing of loans. Mortgage contracts generally 
have, at the minimum, cost deferral.38 This means that as either a prime or subprime mortgage 
                                                          
34 George M. Cohen (2011)  
35 Zywicki T. J and Adamson d Joseph (2009)  
36 George M. Cohen (2011) 
37 Zywicki T. J and Adamson d Joseph (2009)  
38 Oren Bar-Gill (2009) 
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contract, it is essentially a loan agreement, and hence repayment is expected to be done over a period 
of time.  
Prime vs Sub-prime Mortgage contracts 
There are marked differences between prime and sub-primes loans. These differences can viewed 
from different perspectives – from the borrower, default rates etc. From example, viewed from the 
perspectives of the borrower, majorly, the difference can be summed up in costs of administering the 
loan, predominantly in the form of up-front and continuing costs39. Viewed from the default rate, the 
rate of default of subprime lending and mortgage contracts, at least in the United States, largely 
outnumber the default rate of the conventional, traditional mortgage lending.40 The conventional non-
toxic prime mortgage contract is relatively non-complicated, simple transaction. It is typically 
structured on a fixed-rate over a 30-year period, and a required 20% advance or down payment.41 
This is normally referred to as the FRM – fixed-rate-Mortgage. On the other hand, a subprime 
mortgage, as the direct opposite of the prime mortgage, involves a rather complex loan architecture 
combining adjustable-rate mortgages (ARM) and varying degrees of multifaceted pricing 
structures.42 It also has a feature of ending up in the debt profiles of lesser credit-worthy individuals. 
From the general perspectives, the nature of the loan arrangement and the schedule of the payment 
are sacrosanct. The nature of the loan arrangement differentiates both contracts. A viable metric of 
distinguishing the both contracts is the proportion of the loan required to the value acquired. This is 
referred to as the loan-to-value – LTV. The loan-to-value ratio is important in granting a loan. As 
mentioned above, the conventional prime mortgage contracts expects the mortgagor43 to have 20% 
of the house value as down payment, implying a ratio of less than 80%.44 Whereas the subprime 
mortgage contracts, particularly in the recent months before the crisis, there are documented 
evidences of loan-to-value exceeding 90%45. 
                                                          
39 Benjamin J. Keyes (2008)  
40 Zywicki T. J and Adamson d Joseph (2009)  
41 Oren Bar-Gill (2009)  
42 Ibid p 1096 
43 This is the borrower in the mortgage contract who, after the successful execution of the contract, 
becomes the homeowner.  
44 Oren Bar-Gill (2009)  
45 It is one of the issues raised in the later chapter about the concerns of the Regulation (EU) 
2017/2402. It seems to me that the Regulation doesn’t consider the contract structure of the 
underlying asset. This may as well make the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 Rather comestic. 
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Securitization of loans will be eventually impaired if the underlying mortgage contract is impaired 
by not using a reflective LTV ratio. If underlying loan structures are not addressed, it is doubtful the 
outcome of such derivatives will not be impaired, regardless of the STS tag or otherwise. Worst still, 
the median of the preceding 32 months46 before the financial crisis indicates a zero-down payment, 
meaning a 100% loan-to-value.47 
In addition, another sub-metric for gauging the difference of both contracts (apart from the nature of 
the loan agreement, measured by the LTV) is the schedule of payments of the loan. In prime mortgage 
contracts, the repayments are structured on a fixed-rate basis where the mortgagor pays the same 
amount regularly. Where an adjustable-rate is applicable, the variation in the amount of money paid 
is minimal. This is because a pre-determined, constant decimals are added to a fluctuating index 
(interest rates, typically, and for example, the EUROBOR or LIBOR)48, that does not cause any 
significant systemic change in the payment. However, with subprime mortgage, on the other hand, 
there is an accumulative payment scheme. The true interest rates chargeable are not totally disclosed. 
Lower rates are set for the introductory period, typically, around the first two years of the contract, 
and a higher interest rate chargeable in subsequent months.49 
The general characteristics of the subprime mortgage or lending hence include: the high cost of 
servicing and underwriting. This is so because, by its very nature, subprime mortgages (are usually 
securitized) involves lumping homeowners of varying degree of credit worthiness together. More so, 
usually subprime mortgage holders’ investigations are slightly longer and more tedious: holders 
typically present lesser or incomplete documentations, they have (more often than not) are in 
relatively unstable employment, tender unusual collateral etc. All these end up hiking the cost of the 
loan. Amidst the contracts typically used in financial transactions, the adhesion contracts50 top the 
list. These contracts, by their very nature, do not leave options for negotiations from the weaken party 
in the contracts. Normally, financial contracts, and by extension, many mortgages are couched in 
adhesion contracts.51 From the origin of the financial crisis, in the United States, adhesion contracts 
                                                          
46 The median is calculated from 2005, 2006, and the first six months of 2007. 
47 Oren Bar-Gill (2009)  
48London interbank Offered Rates and EURO interbank Offered Rate, respectively. 
49 Oren Bar-Gill (2009)  
50 Adhesion Contracts implies a standardized contract structure that strengthens or widen the gap 
between an economically advantaged parties over other parties. It is structured with no chance for 
negotiation for the weaken party in a contract. 
51 Smith, S (2010)  
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were evident prior the crisis, just like the previous financial crises before it.52 That perhaps explains 
the advantage of the mortgagors in mortgage contracts. 
2.1 Securitization and the Financial Crisis 
 
By the fall of 2008, the effect of the financial crisis had resulted in huge bank loss and nationalizations 
of financial institutions in advanced economies, particularly in Europe and North America. In scale, 
it is the most devastating since the crisis of 1933.53 The goodwill and reputation of securitization as 
a viable means of risk transfer and access to fund has been marred, as a result of the financial crisis.54 
The securitization market in the EU, in particular got impaired. Public issuance of Asset Backed 
Securities (ABS) got very limited and mostly concentrated in a few jurisdictions55. The market 
significantly reduced. The financial crisis eroded the good image of securitization as the crisis 
uncovered the execution of complex, risk-laden deals alongside poorly rated assets. In addition, the 
financial crisis reduced the potentials of banks to provide funding.56  
Securitization is believed and agreed to have played a prominent role in the financial crisis57, 
particularly the abuse of the payment arrangement. In at least four ways, securitization contributed to 
the financial crisis, directly or indirectly. For example, the subprime mortgage securitization activated 
the subprime crisis58, and the subprime crisis was a subset of the financial crisis itself. In the process, 
subprime mortgage is revealed as perhaps a faulty asset type for securitization. There is also the 
structural deficiency of securitization that aided the financial crisis. By this, I mean the models or 
forms at which securitizations are used. For example, the model of originate-to distribute59 potentially 
creates moral hazard60 and securitization creates servicing conflicts as well as overreliance of external 
validation, e.g. mathematical models or rating agencies61. Little wonder many critiques focused on 
the originate-to-distribute model62 after the financial crisis. Perhaps the originate-to-distribute model 
is just symptomatic to the overall capacity of how misused financial innovation can be devastating. 
                                                          
52 Ibid 
53 Ray Barell and E. Philipps Davis (2008)  
54 European Central Bank and Bank of England (2014) 
55 Ibid 
56 AFME (2014) 
57 Schwarcz (2016) 
58 Schwarcz (2009) 
59 This system is explained in a subsequent section.  
60 Schwarcz (2009) 
61 Ibid 
62 Bavaso (2012) 
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The Financial crisis had numerous signs prior it eventual existence. In the years preceding the 
eventual financial crisis, securitization, particularly in the United States, soared remarkably.63 The 
increase in securitization activities were not particularly harmful but for the complexities and opacity 
that surround asset-backed transactions. As theoretically expected, the increase in the volumes of 
securitization should, under well-functioning market conditions, guarantee transfer and redistribution 
of risks in the system, however, unfortunately, that did not take place.  
The pronounced precursors include low global synthetically created interest rates64, credit 
enlargement and soaring asset prices particularly in the real estate and mortgage sector, low short-
term real interest rates, high risk financial products65, in that particular order.66 Financial institutions 
therefore, in a bid to meet the high returns from investors, resorted to securitization (and particularly 
on its ability to be an off-balance sheet item) with little supervision and monitoring. Consequently, 
banks engaged in risk financial products over the normal level they would have otherwise engaged 
in67 because of the seeming ‘free cash flow’ securitization afforded with high credit ratings most 
securitization products got. The rating agencies also played major part. Some subprime mortgages 
were rated good enough to be securitized alongside primes ones. It was not too long before the bubble 
bust. In addition, the use of securitization, lowered the motivation for credit institutions to properly 
screen risk borrowers.68 Borrowers with relatively low credit worthiness were granted loans because 
of the bundling and repackaging of the loans securitization affords. 
Apart from the above mentioned harbingers of the financial crisis, there were other causes of the crisis 
as it relates to the securitization. In the US, for example, there were policy flaws.69 Particularly 
monetary policy errors. To combat internal monetary policy challenges already dating half-a-decade 
before the crisis, the US had lax monetary policies in response to the bearish equity market of 2003. 
This corresponds with Rosen’s70 submission that regulatory arbitrage71 motivates credit institutions 
                                                          
63 European Central Bank and Bank of England (2014) 
64 According to Barell et al, the interest rates were artificially induced to be low, as many countries, 
for example china, turn out high liquidity from foreign exchange reserves and current accounts 
surpluses. In the process, the pressure resulting therefrom caused the artificial low interest rates. 
65 Products like structured finance innovations and sub-prime loans 
66 Ray Barell and E. Philipps Davis (2008)  
67 Ibid 
68 Richard J. Rosen (2010)  
69 Ray Barell and E. Philipps Davis (2008)  
70 Richard J. Rosen (2010)  
71 Regulatory arbitrage implies the circumvention of law, essentially monitoring loopholes in legal 




to engage in securitization.  In addition, wrong scope of regulation also contributed to the 
securitization crisis of the financial crisis. The regulation scope of most the central banks did not 
cover financial innovations and structured finance products. Central Banks and Federal Reserve tend 
to focus more on the interest rates with little emphasis on price stability. Worst still, micro and macro 
prudential guidelines and regulation are somewhat disintegrated in advanced economies72. For 
instance, in the US, the micro prudential regulation is fragmented. In the UK, it is detached from the 
Central Bank, and in the EU, there is no uniform regulator. In other words, in the EU, there are varying 
degrees of the implementation of financial regulations. 
 
2.2 Originate-to-Distribute Model 
 
Closely connected to the financial crisis was the originate-to-distribute model, particularly of 
mortgage securitizations. Traditionally, credit institutions fund loans through the deposits received 
from customers and retain same in the balance sheet, until, typically, the maturity of such loans. This 
conventional means is called the originate-to-hold model. However, things changed drastically when 
credit institutions, particularly banks began to extend their funding sources to include commercial 
paper financing, repurchase agreements, and corporate bond financing.73 The Originate-to-Distribute 
Model is thus replaced with the Originate-to-Distribute Model, which means that the prior the 
maturity of the funded by credit institutions, the loans are repackaged into assets and are not retained 
in the balance sheet. Banks started the distribution with simple transactions like mortgages, credit 
cards, and students’ loans.74  First with, the process started with loans syndication.75 This as however 
metamorphosed to a rather complex arrangement where funds are originated and distributed to wide 
range of financial transactions and products. As securitization grew, it became rather easy for banks 
to ‘sell mortgage loan that they originated’.76 The selling of loans, particularly mortgages, was 
connected to the financial crisis because ‘banks sell mortgages as part of the securitization process, 
but few actually do the securitization’.77  
                                                          
72 It is one of the reason that this thesis focuses on the Regulation that intends to sanitize and improve 
the securitization transaction in Europe.  
73 Vital M. Bord and Joao A. C. Santos (2012)  
74 Ibid 
75 Loan syndication implies the cooperation of group of borrowers to fund and give out loan to a 
single debtor. 
76 Richard J. Rosen (2010)  
77 Rosen (2010) 
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Against the previous originate-to-hold model, the new originate-to-distribute model afforded 
flexibility for credit institutions, particularly banks, to alter the size of mortgages without necessarily 
altering the entire their entire ‘equity capital or asset portfolio. Consequently, the transfer and 
management of risks through the Originate-to-Distribute Model caused the start of low quality 
mortgages.78 Eventually, ‘banks with excessive involvement in the originate-to-distribute market had 
incentives to issue inferior mortgage loans, which in turn contributed to the financial crisis’’, since 
through the originate-to-distribute model and securitization, it is possible to profit from origination 
fees without necessarily bearing risks. Turns out that one of the highlights of the Regulation (EU) 
2017/2402 is the ban of the Originate-to-Distribute Model, in the form of re-securitization. It is yet 
to be seen how events will unfold in relation to the securitization market. 
 
2.3. Snapshot of Securitization in Europe: Before and After the Crisis 
 
The start of the use of securitization as a financial innovation, on a rather large scale, is essentially 
traceable to the late 198079. Before then, securitization has only been done in a small scale. As it 
stands, there are varying degree of the use of securitization in Europe: while some have developed a 
robust market for it, and even drawn the legal and regulatory framework of its smooth operations, 
some are just evolving. At the moment, the securitization market in Europe is weakened and 
impaired.80 Attempts are made to revive the market, and restore confidence in its operations, 
particularly after the role securitization played in the financial crisis. The securitization market in 
Europe has declined quite remarkably after the financial crisis.81 In figure 2, 3 and 4 attached below, 
a tabular account of the state of the securitization market is represented. As it stands, the overall 
pricing of the secured products, particularly asset-backed securities, are impaired because of the poor 
rating of backing assets, restrictions in European inter-bank lending (from the European Central 
Bank) and restrictions of insurance companies’ use of secured financial products82. The indicators of 
the impaired securitization market in Europe is evidenced by shrunken issuance of Real Mortgage 
Backed Securities and European Collateralized Debt Obligations, and reduced ratio of number of new 
                                                          
78 Purnanandam A (2010)  
79 Theodore Baums (1996)  
80 ECB and BOE (2014) 
81 In monetary terms, prior the crisis, the ABS market in Europe was over 1 trillion dollars in 2008. 
After the crisis, in 2013, it is less than a quarter of a trillion dollars. Altomonte and Bussoli (2014)  
82 Altomonte and Bussoli  (2014) 
20 
 
issuance placed on the market and those retained by the originators. There is the steady decline in the 
issuance of European securitization immediately after the financial crisis. 
At the end of the crisis, the total European securitization was almost half a trillion Euros. It has 
steadily reduced ever since. Currently, at the end of the first half of 2018, the total issuance of 
European securitization is around 125 billion Euros. Compared to the United States, the European 
Securitization hasn’t totally recovered from the financial crisis. Whereas, the United States total 
issuance has topped the pre-crisis level (evidenced from the table), the European securitization level 
is still at about half of its pre-crisis level. 
Many countries in the EU are quite active in securitization deals83. Issuance based on the country of 
collateral, using 2017 as the benchmark, the UK has the highest securitization deals, followed by 
France, Italy, and Spain in that particular order. However, from the available data for this year, 2018, 
The Netherlands leads in the amount of the issuance of securitization deals. Expectedly, residential 
mortgage backed securities, RMBS84 are the most actively issued securitization transaction in this 
year, followed by asset-backed securitization (ABS), then collateralized debt or loan obligation 
CDO/CLO. Understandably, many countries in Europe are different level of the development and 
sophistication of securitization. Each country also has distinct story of how securitization evolved, 
regulated and how it is currently fairing. For example, special laws guiding securitization was 
available in French law already before the end of 1980s, while The UK has dedicated securitization 
market for car loans, tax-based securitization deals, and home equity loans. By the late 1988 there 
was the FCC (Fonds Commun de Cr’ances) and the insolvency laws that complement the French 
securitization law. Reflective of the Member States’ responsibility in the implementation of some EU 
policies, EU member States oversee and undertake securitization deals within its border, where 
applicable with the national laws.  
In addition, many of the EU countries have developed suitable infrastructure to admit the smooth 
supervision of securitization, depending on the peculiarities. For example, unlike France, when it 
started, the UK did not have dedicated laws for securitization. Thus, sectors which the securitized 
                                                          
83 AFME  (2018)  
After March 2019, after the successful trigger of the Art 50 of the TFEU, and depending of the 
outcome of the negotiation with the EU, the UK may seize to be part of the EU. 
84 Other European issued securitization include Small and Medium-Sized (SME) securitization, 
Commercial Mortgage-Backed securitization (CMBS), and asset-backed commercial paper, ABCP 
securitizations etc 




deals are carried out, monitor the deals. Take for example, while the Bank of England monitors the 
overall banking affairs to ascertain that capital adequacy measure are in place for banks ‘’reduced 
need for capital only if it has no risk from the loans which it has sold’’, respective commissions 
monitors securitizations for products concerning the sector. That is the reason that in the UK, the 
Building Society Commission, empowered by the 1986 Building Societies Act, issue mortgaged-
backed assets. The before-and-after the financial crisis evaluation, the  UK’s ‘new issuance 
represented almost a third of total European Issuance on average until 2008, but after the peak, UK 
flows dropped by 90 percent, with new issuance in 2013 representing less than 20 percent of the 
European total’’.85 
There are potentials for the European securitization market in Europe, if under necessary conditions, 
the European Central Bank intervenes in the market.86 The idea of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 is 
laudable. It can be combined with the intervention of the European Central Bank. The timely 
intervention of the ECB in buying existing European asset-backed securities so as to free the on-
balance sheet capital of banks to enhance lending and also buying the residential mortgage-backed. 
As plausible as these conditions are, utmost care is needed to avoid conflicts with fiscal policy 
measures.87 This is in addition to the fact that central banks, national authorities and policy makers 
are increasing the call for reinforcement of the securitization market in Europe.88 
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Figure 4: Current comparative figure of European, US, and Australian Securitization issuance: 
Source: 
2.3. The EU and the Financial Crisis 
 
Apart from the global financial crisis, the EU had its crisis also. The EU crisis came in diverse forms 
– financial, economic, unemployment, solvency challenges, credit, and slow economic growth, 
frictions in the financial system, liquidity and increasing public debt.89  There are reasons to believe 
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the EU crisis was connected to the financial crisis. The huge impact of the financial crisis amplified 
the EU crisis. The EU crisis itself was far-reaching and it posed a huge threat to the integrity (and to 
a large extent) tried to undermine the achievement of the European Union.90 It cascaded down from 
the EU central level to the member states too, economically.  
To be sure, the nature and the structure of the European Monetary Union91 itself compounded the 
crisis. For instance, at its inception, the European Monetary Union was created with the primary goal 
of price stability, as proposed from the Maastricht Treaty in the form of deficit and debt ceilings. This 
implies that with the monetary policies being handled centrally and the corresponding fiscal policies 
left in the hands of the Members States the EMU is a ‘fragile mechanism involving self-
contradictions’.92 
In the area of unemployment, the impact of the global financial most certainly impacted the EU. 
Understandably so, some countries in the Eurozone are impacted than others, with southern European 
countries more hit. While the initial response of the EU to the global financial crisis had relatively 
positive impact, say for three years, the situation overturned and moved to austerity.93 
There are various plausible narratives for the causes of the EU crisis, however, the most compelling 
and relevant for this thesis is the economic and legal. In the economic narrative, there are symptoms 
of an ailing EU economy already. These symptoms, of varying proportions, are pointing to an 
imminent crisis. One of such was the sovereign debt crisis. Sovereign debt crisis occurs when a State 
cannot meet its financial obligations in settling its borrowed funds and resources.94  
When States demonstrate their ability to regularly (and perhaps as agreed with the creditors) service 
their debts, without potentially having to whimsically altering the state’s survival, then debt is 
sustainable. Debt sustainability thus is important because of the possibility of a state to keep on 
borrowing to service its debts or the debt accumulation keeps growing faster than the state’s ability 
to meet or service its debts.95 Just as the loan-to-value is crucial in the administration of loans to 
                                                          
90 Patrick, Stewart M (2010) 
91 EMU is the European Monetary Union. It is the Union that brings all the countries that have the 
EURO as their currency. 
92 Patomäki, Heikki.  
93 International Labour Office. (2012) 
94 Whereas known conventional means of raising funds and resources for states include borrowing 
from either external means or domestically, taxing businesses and persons, and outright currency 
issuance. To avoid inflation, it is not unusual for States to recourse to borrowing, particularly when 
the generate tax funds are inadequate to meet its needs internally. 
95 M. Megliani (2015) 
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private individuals, discussed in previous chapter, Loan sustainability is also crucial on a sovereign, 
national level. The debt crisis in Greece, and that engulfed part of the Eurozone, particularly the 
countries that are infamously referred to the PIIGS – Portugal, Ireland, Italy, and Spain – led to 
significant changes to the economic narrative of the EU crisis.96 In sum, before the eventual crisis, 
there are combination trends97 and contemporary developments that culminated in the crisis.  
2.3.1 The Contemporary Events 
 
As highlighted above, the EU crisis was caused by the blend of recent developments and secular 
trends. Compelling recent developments that triggered the EU crisis, although not exhaustive, include 
shorter-term economic events and developments.98 First, the primary consequence and losses of the 
sub-prime mortgages in the United States erode, at the very least, the confidence in the Financial 
markets. Admittedly, the spill-over of the effect of the houses crisis in the rest of the world did not 
show up until around 2007 when the inter-connectedness of the financial systems began to show in 
Europe and the rest of the world. The loss, however, has been on, albeit in a measured degree in the 
United States but came to the full glare during the crisis itself.99 It is arguable whether the State 
involvement (directly or otherwise) through, for example, the enactment and implementation of 
housing policies remotely contributed to the eventual collapse of the mortgage crisis that led to the 
financial crisis.    
Consequently, finance and real estate firms started having financial difficulties with rather popular 
and big firms folding-up. The result was a full-fledged crisis. The response to the crisis took different 
shapes in different jurisdictions, but one of the common stance was the States’ involvement in varying 
fashions. National governments, mostly through the central banks, either carryout full bail-out or 
partial bail-out to firms considered too-big-to fail, in an attempt to salvage what was the remaining 
in the aftermath of the crisis. 
                                                          
96 Tuori, Kaarlo (2014) 
97 According to Tuori, Kaarlo, trends can widely vary in accordance to their duration. For example, 
consistent trends that last up to a decade and more times are referred to as ‘secular’ trend. 
98 They are referred to shorter terms events, because compared to the secular trends that are at least 
10 years of persistent trends. 
99 There are number of merger and acquisitions that are facilitated by government, or direct or indirect 
State-involved actions of activities that shows the signs of reduced capacities of companies to carry 
out certain economic activities. Confirmed from the Bank of International Settlement’s report of 2009 
– JP Morgan Chase takeover of Bear Stearns was State-involved. 
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It is also arguable if the responses to the crisis in the various fashion from different government100 is 
sufficient to curb the crisis then, or a recurrence. The EU had its fair share in the losses. The most hit 
being, perhaps ironically, the capitalized and interconnected to the rest of the financial system, 
Germany, for example. Whilst some of the losses, particularly those of market-prices, are expected 
with time to recover, there were other incurred losses that are somewhat permanent. The impact in 
the EU admittedly vary from country to country, depending, for example, the macro and micro-
economic structural peculiarities of the countries.  
In the event of financial crisis of this magnitude, the impact trickles down to the firms, households 
and individuals. It manifests in the decline spending, reduced accessibility of credits, and the 
consequent force of sale of assets. The Euroze is perhaps the most affected compared to the rest of 
the developed countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD. 
The Eurozone, when after other developed OECD countries were showing signs of recovery, was still 
deep-sit in the impact of crisis. This can be argued if the peculiarities of the Eurozone, such as its 
composition, can be one the reasons (other than the economics of the crisis), for its delayed recovery.  
The EU crisis, especially the one affecting Eurozone101 is also triggered by the marked economic 
differences in the countries composing the area. A close look at the rate and speed of the recovery in 
the Eurozone area reveals that the, expectedly, the countries recovered at different rate.  For example, 
Germany, the strongest and largest economy in the Eurozone, recovered faster than, for example, 
countries like Italy and Spain. Apart from the rate of recovery, another index for measuring the 
marked difference in the Eurozone area is the economic peculiarities of the countries102.  
  
 
                                                          
100 Some of the response, apart from the bail-out funds to the firms considered too-big-to-fail, include 
increasing collateral for borrowings, additional provision to banks to increase their liquidity and 
ability to meet customers’ demand, direct buy-up of shares and stocks and debts of affected firms and 
in some cases, governments.  
101 The expression for countries that uses the Euro as their currency. 
102 Greece is a fit in this case. Although undoubtedly severely hit by the crisis, the sovereign debt 
profile and the historical fiscal responsibility (or otherwise) compounded the problem. I do hold the 
opinion that structure of the Eurozone, especially the marriage of different economies with varying 
fiscal structure have a compelling tie to the delay recovery from the crisis. It confirms the fear that 
the crisis in the Eurozone is not only economic (as described above, other developed OECD countries 
show recovery signs after the initial shocks, compared to the slow recovery of the Eurozone) but 




3. Mechanics of Securitization 
In this chapter, the major forms of securitization are discussed. It explores the various types and 
techniques of securitization transactions and how they are completed. With the focus on the global 
financial crisis, the immediately relevant types of securitization – mortgage-backed and asset-backed 
securitizations are discussed. On the one hand Mortgage-backed securitization, as the name suggests, 
are created from the pool of mortgages, and then reworked and sold to investors. On the other hand, 
Asset-backed securitization involves other types of assets that are not linked to mortgages103. Though 
there are many ways securitized assets are classified, prominent characteristics in the classification 
include whether the underlying assets are amortizing or not, and whether mortgage is attached or 
not.104 
3.1 Mortgage-Backed ABS 
 
For securitized assets that are mortgaged attached or mortgaged-backed, there are different forms and 
types. The common ones are listed below: 
i) Pass-through 
 
This is also referred to as participation certificate. It is loosely used to describe the resulting structures 
of CMO105 securitizations.106 It is so-called because it entitles the holder of this mortgage-backed 
securitized asset to direct ownership of pooled mortgaged securities. The name pass-through is 
derived from the fact that the servicer pass-through the proceeds to the investors. The mortgage loans 
in the pool comprises, quite normally, varying degrees of maturities. It is also common to have pass-
through securitization collateralized by distinct repayment rate – level-pay (where the interest and the 
principal are structured and scheduled to be same throughout the maturity) or with varying and fixed 
interest payment.  As a common technique of securitization, the pool of mortgaged loans are 
structured, and as principal and interest payments are made to the pool, ‘’pass-through’’ remittances 
are made to the investors. It is also known or used as an amortizing structure.107 
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105 CMO is an abbreviation for Collateralized Mortgage Obligation. It is discussed in-depth in the 
next session. 
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ii) CMO – Collateralized Mortgage Obligations 
Collateralized mortgage Obligation is comprised of many pass-throughs. Thus, it is a pool comprising 
varying degrees and different classes of pass-through mortgage-backed securities and loans, and acts 
as the primary resulting structure of mortgage securitization.108 CMO are structured with definite 
intent. They are sometimes used, as the name suggests, as a collateral for further securitization.109 
Since it comprises pools of pass-throughs, the classes and tranches making up the CMOs have distinct 
characteristics that satisfy the investment intents of each of the classes. There are different offerings 
of CMOs. In structural context, they are sometimes referred to as pay through structure. They come 
in different shades, as explained above, with the intent of meeting the investment objectives of the 
subscribed holders. The most simple, perhaps, is the plain vanilla tranches (and sometimes, called 
sequential-pay). They are so-called because of the simplicity.110 This form of CMO is structured in a 
way that payments from the underlying mortgage loans are remitted, with priority is given to a 
particular participant or holders of a particular tranche. There is a form of hierarchy in the payment 
pattern. The tranche in a higher hierarchy receives payment first, and in full, before subsequent 
tranche receives payment. In essence, all the payments – scheduled or unscheduled principals 
received from the underlying mortgage loans are paid to the higher tranche, first.  
Take for example, in a CMO that has three parts in the transaction, with varying degree of maturity, 
say for illustration, 6 years, 12 years, and 15 years respectively, the tranche with the 6 years gets it 
payment first and in full before the tranche of 12 years receives its own. The name ‘sequential pay-
down’ is thus derived from the structure of the payment, as the ‘sequential pay-down continues until 
the last tranche – the security having the longest maturity – is retired’ and paid.111 
Another popular form of a CMO is the planned Amortization (PAC) tranches. 
As the name implies this type of CMOs is planned, and structured in way that a buffer or sinking fund 
is created to mitigate possible fluctuations in the payment arrangement. So alongside the principal 
tranche, there are other tranches in the arrangement, often referred to as support tranches. They are 
also sometimes referred to as companion tranches. So the PAC is planned in a way that the principal 
fund is fixed, provided the ensuing prepayments continue to be within the envisaged range band. 
                                                          
108 Frank J Fabozzi and Vinod Kothari (2008) 
109 Deka and Kara (2017) 
110 Cornerstone Mortgage (2016) 
111 The Bond Market Association (1999) 
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When there are fluctuations in the prepayments arrangement, the companion or support tranches are 
adjusted according to provide the envisaged stability. Thus, the fixed nature of the fund is guaranteed, 
although PAC thus may need pay on a different principal schedule. Comparatively, the PAC tranche 
tends to have a stable outlook throughout the maturity. So the PAC is designed to produce a stable 
cash flow by redirecting the risk of payment through the companion tranches112. Typically, it is 
commonly used because of its relative stability. 
Targeted Amortization Class (TAC) Tranches  
This tranche works similarly to the PAC. The difference is inherent in the adjustment procedure of 
the fluctuations of the prepayments. It is essentially a scheduled tranche that remitted on a 
predetermined prepayment model113. With TAC, alongside the features of PAC, additional protection 
is factored should there be an early redemption. Like the PAC, it also provides more cash-flow 
certainty, but has (on the average) higher yield than the PAC. 
 
Support/Companion Tranches 
These are the tranches that offer support for the fluctuations in the prepayment arrangement of the 
fund. As explained above, the planned or targeted amortization could have slight changes in the 
principal fund, occasioned by prepayment fluctuations. Thus the support of the companion tranches 
are used in the ensuing adjustments, stability and predictable cash flow. Hence the primary roles of 
the support tranches is to provide absorbing features to the varied prepayments to the principal fund. 
The variability that the support tranches control works in both ends – first to cushion short fall from 
the main principal fund, and second, to absorb excesses. Therefore the support tranches are used 
alongside the PAC and TAC tranches. The life span, typically, for support tranches works hand-in-
hand with the interest rates applied. When the interest rates rise, the support tranches’ lifespan 
stretches and when interest rates decline, the lifespan reduces. Because of the rather intense 
fluctuations and volatility, the support tranches, in compensation, offer slightly higher yields when 
prepayment is near to the envisaged rate at the time of purchase.114 
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The Z-tranches are structured in the close consideration for the lock-out periods115. In a way, they are 
the riskiest of the tranches because the payment are made after other tranches have been paid116. Thus 
Z-tranches are those that are arranged in a way that no interest is paid in lock-out periods, or any other 
conditions for that matter. Often times, the Z-tranches are referred to accretion or accrual bonds. For 
the entire time of the lock-out periods, the Z-tranches holders are not paid interest until the end of the 
period. This thus means (and ultimately) makes the Z-tranches, during the lock-out period, to have 
accrued interests. The accrued interests and the face value are credited at the designated coupon rates 
and agreed payment dates. Soon as there are no other active tranches and the lock-out periods are 
ended, holders of Z-tranches are then paid the accrued interests, alongside the principal. For its 
peculiar features, the Z-tranches are usually structured for relatively long term. Compared to (and 
used alongside) other tranches, for example, the PAC, the Z-traches are the last to tranches. 
 
iii) Stripped Mortgage-Backed Securities 
 
As the name suggests, these securities are mortgage-backed but are rather structured that they are 
stripped. They are so-called because, unlike the conventional mortgage-backed securities, the cash 
flow is from strictly interests only or principals only of the underlying mortgages. The distinction 
makes these securities stripped. Stripped mortgage-backed securities, because of their nature, are 
somewhat sensitive to interest rate fluctuations. They are often times structured to respect 
peculiarities and the distinct tastes of various investors. They suit investors with various timing of 
repayment length and duration. The interest rate risk and exposure structure of stripped mortgage, 
correspondingly, are inversely related depending on the split – principal only or interest only. This 
means that when interest rate reduces, the principal only strip increases in price and the price of the 
principal rate only strip reduces and vice versa.  
 
Thus in principle, there could be many variations in the way the stripped mortgage-backed securities 
can be structured – principal-only, interest-only, residuals, floating rate tranches etc. Although the 
most common division is the split between the principal-only and the interest-only stripped mortgage-
backed securities. Each with its distinct characteristics designed for the repayment need and tastes of 
                                                          
115 Lock-out periods are the time, where because of the presence and quite active nature of other 
tranches, there is relative silence or absence of payment of interest. 
116 Cornerstone Mortgage (2016) 
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the investors, alongside desired flexibilities as the case may warrant. For the principal-only, for 
example, the securities may be structured as a Pass-through or a tranches in a Collateralized Mortgage 
Obligation, CMO. At the point of purchase of the principal-only securities, the would-be holders pay 
an amount that is actually a discounted value from the face value of the security. The whole face 
value is eventually received through scheduled payments. A noticeable downturn is that the principal-
only strip can be super sensitive to interest rates. If a principal-only strip is made alongside (or 
entirely) as companion tranche (as explained above), the companion or support tranche is referred to 
as Super PO.117 
 
On the flip side, an interest-only security does not have face or par value. Because it is inversely 
related to the principal-only strip, it is sold also at a discounted, notional price. The notional price is 
principal balance used to compute the interest due. The calculation is done on the basis of the present 
value of the expected interest to be received. As a norm, the price is typically expressed as a 
percentage of the notional principal. In inverse relationship with the principal-only security, also 
means that as the notional principal price ‘amortizes and repays’ the interest-only strip cash flow 
reduces. This inverse relationship with the principal-only security, turns out to be a special feature 
that distinguishes the interest-only mortgage backed security as one of the few securities that 
increases as the interest rate exposure increases. Another benefit, in terms of the features, of the 
interest-only mortgage-backed security include over-par returns and high yields. This can also turn 
out to be a demerit in that the hype sensitivity to volatility of the interest rate may work against the 
investor. This shows that the interest-only mortgage-backed securities can be very risky.  
 
The residual tranches, the name indicates, implies that tranches that are mops the remaining cash flow 
from the underlying mortgage after when every other obligations have been met. The feature of this 
tranche makes it to be the last on the collection of cash flow. As an advantage, it is flexible and can 
be structured in virtually in form – as a PAC or any other sequential arrangement. It is also considered 
as different on the basis of its tax consideration and characteristics. Floating-rate tranches, as a 
mortgage-backed security, on the other hand are those that have their interest rate tied to an interest-
rate index118. It is not unusual to have many securities (by extension major financial instruments) 
                                                          
117 The Bond Market Association (1999) 
 
118 Interest rate index is typically an index that is connected to the interest rate of a combined set of a 
defined financial instrument. As an index, it is determined by the aggregate performance of the 
individual instrument making up the set. So, it is more or less like a basket of financial instrument 
with the underlying interest rate determined together as a set. There are however exception to the rule 
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have their interest rate based on an index. In determining mortgage-based assets’ interest rate, an 
adjustable rate119 may be tied to the interest rate of the underlying mortgage. Common interest rate 
index is the LIBOR120. Thus for the floating rate tranches, they have interest rate that are tied to the 
fluctuations of interest rate index, such as the LIBOR. It is also possible to have predetermined limit 
or extent to which the tie to the interest rate index can reach. For example, there could be a defined 
‘cap’ or ‘floor’, upper and the lower limits, respectively, that a floating rate tranche can be tied. It is 
equally possible to structure the floating rate tranche as a TAC or PAC. 
 
3.2 Non Mortgage-Backed Securities 
 
The major difference between the mortgage-backed and nonmortgage-backed securities is the 
underlying asset. As their respective names suggest, in the former, the underlying asset is tied to a 
mortgage, while in the latter, the underlying asset can be just anything, aside a mortgage. The non-
mortgage backed securities can also be exactly structured as the mortgage-back. The illustrated types 
of the mortgage-backed securitization explained above – from the most basic and simple pass-
throughs to deeply complicated arrangements of pay-throughs. It equally employs range of 
flexibilities and possibilities, along the desired pattern of investors’ risks, returns and maturities. 
However, the common feature in the classification of the non-mortgage-backed ABS is based on how 
the pooled resources are issued and how interests on the structured fund are generated. The issuance 
structure varies, considerably, in-line with the intent of the securitization and the risks tastes of the 
targeted investors. The issuance structure and the generated interest can be categorized broadly in the 
way they are amortized or revolved. This slightly differentiates the non-mortgage-backed ABS from 
the mortgage-backed explained above.  
On the one hand, the amortizing and non-amortizing asset is closely related to how mortgage-backed 
securitizations works. In actual fact residential mortgages are prime examples of amortization of 
assets. The amortization is the one that needs to be paid off within a scheduled period of time. These 
payments are usually structured to include the original principal and the accruing interests. The non-
amortizing assets, on the flip side, are those that do not have strict scheduled period of the repayment 
arrangement. They are usually structured in the way that the payments can be revolving. Prime 
                                                          
where an index can be based on a single item – say for example the yield on the U.S Treasury 
securities. 
119 Usually called the ARM – Adjustable rate of Mortgage.  
120 The LIBOR is an acronym for the London Inter Bank Offered Rate. The World most used index 




example is revolving credit card account, where scheduled (or preplanned repayment, as the case may 
be) are not necessarily required but a regular payment that are calculated based on an accrued interest 
and principal balance.  
 
On the other hand, the issuance structures of the pooled resources can be categorized according to the 
ability for amortization of the process. For example securitizations that are structured in a way that 
the proceeds or the principal are returned to the investors for throughout the maturity period of the 
security is particularly amortizing and spread throughout the period of the life of the security the 
investors receive returns. To make this obligation of making return to investors feasible, it is not 
unusual that a conscious calculation is made to make the cash flow from the underlying asset to match 
the payment stream required and due to the investors. Alternatively, the structure can be made to have 
similar payment stream and maturity with the underlying asset in a bid to be able to meet the returns 
obligation to the investors. Either way, obligations throughout the life of the asset is guaranteed the 
investors. A noticeable drawback is the prepayment risk associated with this non mortgage-backed 
ABS. The common used structures are Pass Throughs, and Pay Throughs – which can be customized.  
As with the mortgage-backed asset, the pass-through in non-mortgage-backed asset securitization is 
the basic, commonly used. In this issuance structure, the returns to the investors are proportionate and 
comparable to the allocation of their investments – comprising the principal and interests – just as the 
proceeds are from the streams from the underlying security throughout the lifetime of the 
securitization. This means that as the underlying assets cash flow are produced, the correspondingly 
proportional amount is given to the investors throughout the lifetime of the asset. This principles is 
transferred and applied to all pass-throughs of non mortgage-backed securitization, even if there are 
multiple tranches involved in the structure. Where that are multiple tranches, for example, there is 
actual pro-ration that is done to arrive at a proportional allocation of the proceeds from the underlying 
instrument to the respective investors.  
As with the pay-throughs, the non mortgage-backed securitization can also be arranged to have 
sequential pay-through structures. This is possible to make them custom-made to accommodate the 
differences in the tastes of maturities and cash-flow generation. On either side of the adopted style – 
pay-through or pass-through - the interest accruable can either be floating or fixed. As a noticeable 
trend in European securitizations and European investors’ taste121 show, non mortgage-backed 
                                                          
121 The authors and editors of (The Bond Market Association. European Securitization: A Resource 
Guide. European Securitization Forum, New York) describe this distinguishing feature with 
European securitization investors. 
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securitizations in Europe tend to be skewed towards having a floating rate (instead of fixed interest 
rate). This is particularly so because of the need to have assets and financial instruments tied to a 
reference interest rate benchmark122.  
In addition to the possibility for the choice of the floating interest rate over fixed rates, when a fixed 
interest rate is used, the possibility of having a mismatch of the cash-flow from the underlying assets 
and the required outcome is appreciably heightened. Thus, to avoid a possible mismatch or varied 
outcome from the interest rate obligation of the underlying asset and what is expected to generate, a 
floating interest rate is thus preferred. It is worthy of note, however, that the choice of a particular 
interest rate regime over another (and the possible attendant problems it could raise) can be easily be 
solved. For instance, the problem of mismatch of the generated cash-flow from the underlying asset 
and the desired outcomes can be worked-out by the issuer and the counterparty, by having an 
arrangement of (for illustration), an interest rate swap. 
There are many innovative ways to structure non mortgage-backed assets. For the revolving assets – 
prime examples include credit cards and trade receivables, leases and consumer debts – securitization 
is done via a controlled amortization structure. The idea is to match the assets’ characteristics with 
the payment structure. Thus, the payment system of the controlled amortization structure is such that 
the nature of the underlying assets is ignored. For example, although an underlying asset can be non-
amortizing in nature, the payment arrangement could be done in such a way that a predictable amount 
and repayment schedule is made to the investors from the outset. The issuance structure is so-called 
as revolving because a ‘revolving period’ is given, which is primarily predetermined. ‘’ After a 
predetermined “revolving” period, during which only interest payments are made, these securities 
call for the return of principal to investors in a series of defined, periodic payments over a specified 
time frame, usually less than a year’’123 
 
                                                          
 
122 It is typically done by adding a margin of profit from the LIBOR rate. This is totally relatable for 
me. I am quite aware from my personal transactions with credit card accounts system and financial 
institutions in Finland, at least, that floating rates are used. After the use of LIBOR as the reference 
rate (presumably for its well acceptance in Europe and, perhaps, for the sentiment of the being 
European), additional margin is added. 





Figure 5: Amortizing Asset-Backed (non mortgage) Securitization payment and issuance structure 
with some of the major characteristics. Source: European Securitization: A Resource Guide. 




Another structure, apart from revolving, is ‘’bullet124’’. This is so-called because the intent of the 
structure is to return principal payment to the investors in one-off, single payment pattern. This can 
also be used in a revolving arrangement, too.  
 
                                                          
124 ’’ “Bullet” structures, which are also used with revolving assets, are designed to return principal 
to investors in a single payment. These ABS also feature two separate cash-flow management periods: 
the revolving period, during which any principal repaid is used to purchase more receivables, which 
are added to the asset pool, and the accumulation period (analogous to the amortization period in a 
controlled amortization structure), during which principal payments build up in a separate account to 
fund the bullet payment to investors. The most common bullet structure is the “soft” bullet, so labeled 
because the bullet payment is not guaranteed on the expected maturity date (although most such ABS 
do in fact return principal on this date). In contrast, a “hard” bullet structure ensures that principal is 
paid off on the scheduled maturity date. This is accomplished by providing for a longer accumulation 
period, a third-party guarantee, or both’’ - The Bond Market Association. European Securitization: A 







Figure 6: The ‘’Revolving’’ issuance and payment structure with some of the major characteristics. 




Other Securitization Transactions and Structures 
Whereas mortgage-backed and non mortgage-backed asset securitizations are somewhat the common 
ones, there are other securitization structures and transactions, especially Collateralized Loan 
Obligations, CLO and Collateralized Bond Obligations, CBO. The CLO is a loan arrangement, at 
best, but used as a security (particularly by banks) and as the name suggests, collateralized by 
commercial bank loans.  It can also assume deeply complicated securitization pattern described above 
with multiple layers of intertwined obligations and counterparties. In some advanced, complex 
transactions of CLO, multiple classes of debts are pooled, and the complexity can be notched higher 
with inclusion of equity. As explained in the opening introduction, the securitization is used through 
the instrumentality of the SPV – Special Purpose Vehicle. Through this medium, the commercial 
bank loans pooled is then refinanced and offered to various investors, especially at the international 
Capital Market and, for example, institutional investors. The Collateralized Bond Obligation, CBO, 
works almost as exactly as the CLO, only that the underlying assets in the former are corporate bonds, 
credit-linked notes, and similar debt securities while the latter uses commercial bank loans. 
Depending on the level of complexity and the layers of counterparties, the underlying assets may not 
be purely a single form of asset. It could be a mixture or hybrid of assets, unsecured and secured 
assets pooled together. 
The Structuring Process 
Securitization are structured differently, in consideration to the investment tastes of desired investors, 
risk profile and security maturity tolerance of the investors. Typically, securitizations are structured 
along the major division of the True Sale (also common referred to as the conventional securitization) 
and the Synthetic securitization. The former implies the use of assets with appreciable degree of 
similar traits. For example, when assets that have comparable envisaged cash flows are pooled 
together and used as the basis of the securitization. It is this pooled assets that are transferred to the 
SPV125. At the point of transfer to the SPV, the original remains bankruptcy remote. It can be a double 
edge stance – as the bankruptcy remoteness of the originator can be either beneficial or disastrous 
outcome. At best, it affords the originator to be able to exempted from documenting the exposure and 
risks, as he now enjoys the ‘’off balance sheet’’ treatment. On the flip, it can engender reckless and 
deliberate irresponsible transfer of toxic assets. 
                                                          
125 Typically, the SPV that buys over the pooled assets are bankruptcy remote to the originator and 
the investor. Thus the SPV undertakes the ownership and the risk associated. 
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There are number of factors that should be met before a true sale securitization can hold. Because 
there is going to be risk isolation and essentially the originator is going to be bankruptcy remote to 
the SPV, the conditions and factors are compulsory, regardless of the transaction structure and the 
legal arrangement of the SPV. The conditions are non-fraudulent transfer, true sale/non-notification, 
no commingling risk (First perfected security interest), Bankruptcy-remote (Non-Consolidation), 
True sale (Non-Limited Recourse). These conditions mean that the finance activities need to be 
unquestionably fraud-free in retrospect, and in addition, the assignment must be valid legally. In 
addition, should there be bankruptcy, the contractual timing of the transactions are sacrosanct, to the 
extent that the time lines of the transaction is unaffected, as the SPV is seen as seen entirely 
independent from the originator with little or no recourse126 rights attached to the originator.  
The synthetic securitization on the other hand is designed for mitigating credit risks. Take for 
example, credit derivatives, credit swaps, credit-links notes etc can be securitized with the intent of 
hedging the attendant risks by the originator. The primary distinction of true sale and the synthetic 
securitization is the fact that while in the former, ownership and the attendant risks are transferred 
altogether to the SPV, in the latter, only the risks are transferred. There are many concerns about the 
use of synthetic securitizations, but the chief seem to be the relative ease at which synthetic 
securitizations allow credits institutions, particularly banks, to transfer risks connected to quality 








                                                          
126 The Principle of limited recourse emphasizes the loan arrangement where the lender has reduced, 
limited (and sometimes, no claim) against the parent company if the collateral can’t offset the debt 
repayment. 
127 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset 
Securitizations, Oct 2001, Bank for International Settlement. 
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4. Securitization: EU legal provision before and after the Financial Crisis 
 
Before the unveiling of the STS proposal128 by the European Parliament and Council, body of law 
dealing with the securitization cuts across major financial regulation such as banking, insurance, asset 
management, credit ratings, prospectus and allied financial matters129. For banking, the provisions 
entail prudential measures, risks transfer as well as its management and retention, due diligence and 
disclosure.  
The summary of banking legal acts include regulation 575/2013/EU, the Commission Delegated 
Regulation 2015/162, the Commission Delegated regulation 625/2014, and the Commission 
Implementing regulation 602/2014.130 The first, Regulation 575/2013/EU relates to Capital 
Requirements Regulation which essentially outlines the prudential requirements for credit institutions 
and investment firms. It is an amendment to a previous regulation (648/2012/EU). Regulation 
575/2013/EU itself has been amended in the autumn of 2014 with the Commission Delegated 
Regulation 2015/62 which dwells on the application of leverage ratios. Prior to the amendment of 
Regulation 575/2013/EU in the autumn of 2014, there was a supplementing Regulation in the spring 
of 2014. The regulation supplemented Regulation 575/2013/EU by focusing on the technical 
standards and requirements for major parties in banking transactions dealing with securitized deals – 
the investors, lenders, originators etc. This is known as the Commission Delegated Regulation 
625/2014. Lastly, in the summer of 2014, the Commission Implementing Regulation 602/2014 spells 
out the applying technical standards for the measurement of risk weights in the initial Regulation 
575/2013/EU. 
                                                          
128 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Laying Down Common 
Rules on Securitization and Creating a European Framework for Simple, Transparent and 
Standardized Securitization and Amending Directives 2009/65/EC, 2009/138/EC, 2011/61/EU and 
Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 648/2012, COM (2015) 472   
129 Schwarcz (2016) 
‘’ The existing regulatory framework governing EU securitization is a hodge-podge that includes 
the Capital Requirements Regulation for banks, the Solvency II Directive for insurers, the UCITS 
and AIFMD directives for asset managers, legal provisions on information disclosure and 
transparency laid down in the Credit Rating Agency Regulation and in the Prospectus Directive, 
and other provisions on the prudential treatment of securitization in Commission legislative 
proposals such as the Bank Structural Reform and Money Market Funds. Id. at 4. ’’ - Schwarcz 
(2016) 




To be sure, the Capital Requirements came into force at the beginning of 2014. It is presently referred 
to as the Capital Requirement Regulation/Directive (CRD 1V). As the name implies, it is a package 
that comprises Regulation and Directive, being the third set of amendments to the original Capital 
Requirement Directives (2006/48 and 2006/49). Thus, at the end of 2013 previous Directives were 
repealed (CRD I, II. III). As presently, constituted, CRD IV/CRR comprises of Regulatory Technical 
Standards, Implementing Technical Standards, Commission Delegated Acts, and Commission 
Implementing Acts. The relevant portion of the CRR that relates to securitization starts essentially 
from Article 242. The portion treats recognition of significant risk transfer in a traditional and 
synthetic securitization scenarios, and how the risk weights and exposure values are calculated. From 
January 2019, Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 will be the latest regulation dealing with prudential matters 
and Capital requirement, acting as a first leg in the securitization regulation.  
4.1 European policy response to the securitization after the financial crisis 
 
There were many measures taken after the financial crisis to curb a possible future reoccurrence in 
Europe. To start with, there are evidences of large volumes of regulations in and outside Europe that 
if implemented could have averted the crisis (or at least reduce its impact). For example in the United 
States, with already two historic crises – the Great Depression and the Savings and Loan Crisis – 
there already body of legislations that could possibly forestalled the financial crisis fueled by the 
mortgage crisis131. Europe also has fully developed body of financial regulations that could possibly 
forestall the crisis, or its effects. In effect, regardless of the body of regulation already in place, there 
were regulatory and policy response after financial crisis, the world over. The sum of the regulatory 
response to securitization can be classified into five different categories – the need to increase 
disclosure, risk-retention requirement, revamping the rating agencies, due diligence requirement132. 
Major EU agencies are involved in the policy responses to securitization. For example, the European 
Parliament and Council and the Financial Stability Board. The crux of the regulatory response is to 
incentivize people to participate more in securitization, especially opening up the process to be 
simpler and transparent. Whilst the European Parliament and Council proposed the framework that 
eventually culminates to the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 (which is central to this thesis and explained 
in details later in this thesis), the FSB – Financial Stability Board – developed a dual-step approach. 
First, it strengthened the monitoring framework that allows national authorities to easily detect (and 
                                                          
131 Smith, S (2010)  
132 Schwarcz (2016) 
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apply corrective measures, where necessary) systemic risks pilling up, entrench transparency 
required. Secondly, it encouraged national authorities to support the execution of the strategy to 
achieve quick recovery of the effects of the financial crisis and the improvement of securitization in 
the continent.133  
The overall interventions (in form of regulations) and initiatives are multifaceted. There are number 
of public sector schemes and programs, transparency and information sharing initiatives, and as well 
as private sector driven pan-European and national initiatives. Some of the regulations include Risk 
Retention Rule134, EU Credit Rating Agency legislation135 and general initiatives that foster 
transparency of information.  
With varying degree of aims and objectives, and the duration for the full implementation, the 
regulatory initiatives work together and they have strong elements in the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402.  
First, the Retention principles aim to synchronize the incentives of all parties to the securitization 
deal, predominantly issuers and investors. This regulation aims that, in Europe, 5% retention 
requirement must be achieved by banks before investing in securitization. It was in force in 2011 and 
a Binding Technical Standards set for 2015 summer. Eventually, when Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 
is fully developed, retention is one of the key component introduced. 
Second, the BCBS Capital and Liquidity requirements136 intend to correct the misalignments in the 
securitization market, bothering on robotic overreliance on credit rating agencies’ judgements, and 
low risk downgrades. It also promotes the elasticity of the liquidity risk profile, albeit on short-term 
basis. The former, pertaining to the Capital, requires banks to have enough capital against investments 
in securitizations and the consultation closed at the spring of 2015; while the latter, pertaining to 
liquidity, requires banks’ liquidity assets to be higher than the estimated net cash outflows over a 
period of 30 days.137  
Third, Solvency II directed specifically at insurance companies. It intends to shore up the capital 
requirements for the insurers so as to be able to improve the quality of insurance protection to the 
securitization active market participants and players. Lastly, Consolidation and Sponsorship. This 
                                                          
133 ECB and BOE (2014) 
134 Originators are expected to maintain some ’’skin-in-the-game’’ 
135 This upgrades the openness of the operations of the rating agencies. 
136 BCBS means the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 
137 ECB and BOE (2014) 
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aims at striking a positive balance between the risks exposure of banks’ off balance sheet items and 
securitization vehicles.138  
 
4.2 Reservations about the policy response 
 
Despite the regulatory interventions, the current state of the European securitization market is still 
passive and yet to regain full recovery of the impact of the financial crisis. The issuance of 
securitization peaked at the start of the financial crisis with over 800 Billion euros, the following 
years as the impact of crisis took its toll, the volume of the issuance in Europe markedly decline. As 
can be seen from the figures below, from 2009 downwards, the issuance at best is about half of the 
issuance level when it’s peaked, and at worst, in the first quarter of 2017, is less than 15% of the 
issuance level of 2008. Interestingly, the contrast is the case in the United States139. Just as the level 
of issuance significantly dropped, the percentage of the securitization vehicles’ placement and 
retention markedly also changed.140 
Therefore, the impact of financial crisis on securitization in Europe is still enormous. Some of the 
reasons for remarkably negative impact include the fact that the confidence and trust in securitization 
is doubtful141. One possible way to increase the faith in the European securitization is to borrow a cue 
from the United States, where incentives like government-backed guarantees can be proposed to 
investors. This can be collectively done – involving the major parties in securitization, the European 
Central bank, national government etc – and the role played in the United States by Fannie Mae and 
Freddy Mac can be replicated in Europe. Another plausible reason for slow recovery of securitization 
is the relative dearth of tailored-made securitization transaction for European investors. By this, I 
                                                          
138 ECB and BOE – The case for a better functioning securitization market in the European Union, 
May 2014 Euro System 
139 Deloitte (2018)  
‘This stands in contrast to US issuance which has recovered more strongly. One factor that has led to 
the US market not to experience such a steep decline in issuance is the role that US government-
sponsored enterprises (eg Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac) play. The EU estimates that around 80 
percent of all US securitization benefit from public guarantees and banks investing in such 
securitizations benefit from lower capital charges.’ 
140 Deloitte (2018) 
‘Prior to 2007, most securitization vehicles were placed, but following the financial crisis, issuers 
have retained the majority of European issuance.’’ 
141 Regardless of the planned and executed interventions of the European Union policy makers, and 
the fact that the very low default rate of triple A and triple B rates of the EU securitization vehicles 
during the financial crisis. 
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mean there could be specialized securitization that take into account the peculiarities of the parties. 
For example, in the case of loan securitization, the distinct positions of the issuer, originator, and 
borrower can be considered. The SME true-sale loan securitization is a classic example of how the 




Figure 7: European historical issuance 2007 to 2017 Q1 (in EUR billion)                                                         
Source: Deloitte (2018)   
 
 
Figure 8: European historical issuance 2007 to 2017 Q1 (in EUR billion) 
                                                          
142 Deloitte (2018) 
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 On their part, both the European Central Bank and Bank of England allege that the current impaired 
state of the securitization market in Europe is caused by ‘misalignments’. These misalignments are 
somewhat deeply ingrained that the sum of the interventions so far are yet to produce the desired 
improvement of the securitization market in Europe. Thus, presently, there are still obstacles in the 
securitization market of Europe. This is as a result of relatively alternative cheaper source of funds, 
overall macroeconomic struggles of many European countries, declining demand for loans, 
inconsistent and ununiformed regulatory frameworks across the jurisdictions, and valid concerns 
about the dwindling price qualities of underlying assets for the securitization pool.143 Hope with 
Regulations 2017/2401 and 2017/2402 coming into force in 2019, there will be increase and 

















                                                          
143 ECB and BOE (2014) 
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5. Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 
 
The Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 is a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council that 
creates the general framework for securitization and creating specific framework for simple, 
transparent and standardized (STS) securitization, and amending Directives 209/65EC, 2009138/EC 
and 2011/61/EU and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and EU No 648/2012. It is a product of a 
rigorous, painstaking, and long process of strengthening the securitization process in Europe. Till 
date, it is the most detailed and far-reaching regulation on securitization in Europe. It emphasizes the 
STS label for securitization transactions that are simple, transparent, and standardized, that will make 
them (such STS-labelled transactions) qualify for better prudential treatment.144  On the one hand, the 
regulation repeals and amends existing Directives and legislative instruments overseeing European 
securitization, and, on the other hand, provides clear guidelines on general and specific securitization 
measures in Europe. It was officially published in the Official Journal of the European Union by 
December 2017, and expects to be in force, Europe-wide, by January of 2019. It is arrived at after 
due consultations and follow-up on proposals145, engagements146, and opinions of relevant 
stakeholders.  
Previously, at the regional level, there have been concerted effort to correct the outcome of the role 
securitization played in the global financial crisis of 2008. Amidst other regulatory and systemic 
approaches in combating the aftermath of the financial crisis, the Commission, at the end of 2014, 
announced its intention to make available workable and trusted securitization markets. The promise 
of the revamped securitization market is expected to be a high-quality, trusted securitization market 
with sufficient transparency, simplicity, and harmonization across the region. Thus the Regulation 
2017/2402 is for financial and credit institutions that operate essentially with securitization. It lays 
down the general and specific frameworks for the operation of securitization. 
Secondarily, the regulation recognizes the place of securitization in the European economy – its large 
economic benefits, particularly the allocation and diversification of risks in the financial system of 
the EU – and the attendant possible damage, if misused.  
                                                          
144 EBA Consultation paper on the STS criteria for non-ABCP securitization. It is hoped that the 
differential capital requirement for the STS-tagged transaction will be sufficient motivation for securitizes 
in Europe to fulfil the criteria of having the STS. 
145 One of such proposals is the opinion of the European Central Bank of OJ C 219, 17.6.2016, p. 2. 
146 The European Economic and Social Committee is also engaged and opinion sought before the 
eventual publication for the Regulation, OJ C 82, 3.3.2016, p. 1. 
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To this end, the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 sets out to mitigate the risks of the increased 
interconnectedness and the excessive leverage that securitization uses. In similar dimension, the 
Regulation 2017/2401 hopes to strengthen the microprudential supervision of the relevant competent 
authorities within the EU that will qualify as the criteria in participating in the securitization market 
in Europe147. In the end, it is expected to enhance efficiency in the financial system, upgrade the trust 
for the sanctity of the market while enjoying the economic benefits derivable from securitization. 
5.1 The structure of the Regulation 
 
The Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 concerns the general guidelines and the specific framework for 
securitization. Those two – the general guidelines and specific framework – form the basic division 
of the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402. The general part involves, primarily, credit risks and tranching. 
The specific framework part relates to having a ‘simple, transparent and standardized (STS) 
securitization. The Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 uses a broad definition of the word ‘securitization’ 
because it contextualizes the term, loosely, to describe transactions and schemes where credit risks 
can be tranched.  
The Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 applies to major stakeholders in the securitization market in Europe 
– the institutional investors148, originators, securitization special purpose entities (SSPE), sponsors, 
and original lenders. These stakeholders have varying definition by the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, 
especially based on the degree of commitment, and interrelationships of the firms in the securitization 
market. For example, by the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, the role of a sponsor is somewhat restricted, 
and it is limited to credit institutions and investment companies. Furthermore, a sponsor is able to 
delegate roles and tasks to servicer, but a sponsor remains the ones responsible for the risk 
management, where the servicer himself is a regulated asset manager.149 In addition, there is supposed 
to be alignment in the interests of the stakeholders, by making sure that the original lender or the 
sponsor retains the greater part or significant part of the underlying exposure of the securitization 
risks.150 
                                                          
147 L 347/35/regulation (EU) 2017/2402 
148 The Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 also broadly uses the term institutional investor to cover of 
finance professionals and companies like insurance or reinsurance entities, institution for 
occupational retirement provision, the AIFM – Alternative investment fund manager, any company 
for the collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS - especially if internally managed), 
credit institution and investment companies. 
149 Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, para 7 
150 Ibid, para10 
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 Interestingly, as a major landmark feature of the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, re-securitization is 
essentially prohibited151. The prime reason for the ban is the aid of re-securitization to opaque nature 
of re-securitization transaction. The drafters of the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 believe that re-
securitization decreases the level of transparency that Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 seeks. There are 
however increased chances of derogation of the ban on re-securitization, where legit, transparent 
transaction is known, or where (or pending) on the (re)classification of ABCP152 as resecuritization153. 
The ban can also be relaxed under ‘exceptional circumstances’ where the resecuritization is in the 
interest of the investors, or where the real economy, via the ABCP programmes, is to benefit. This 
ban starts from when the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 enters into force, hence it does not affect 
securitizations before 2019 and securitizations that are for legitimate154 purposes.  
A securitization transaction, as per the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, is not expected to constitute a 
specialized lending to finance or operate physical assets. So, the Regulation 2017/2402 is aimed at 
streamlining the legislative framework on securitization, and at the same time merge all present 
sectoral legislations on securitization into a single, comprehensive whole.155 
 
Figure 8: The classification of the Regulation and the definition. Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
Société cooperative (Luxemburg, 2018) 
    
                                                          
151 Para 8 of the article emphasizes the ban on re-securitization. There are exceptions, however, where 
there are legit claims of the usefulness of the securitization, referred to as ‘exceptional circumstances’.  
152 ABCP means Asset-backed commercial paper. 
153 Para 8 
154 The definition of legitimate purposes are listed in the para 3, of article 8 of the Regulation 
2017/2402 to include facilitation of winding-up of a credit institution, a financial institution, or an 
investment company, ensuring the viability of as a going concern of a credit institution, an investment 
firm or a financial institution in order to avoid its winding-up and where the underlying exposures are 
non-performing, he preservation of the interest of investors.  
155 2018 PricewaterhouseCoopers, Société coopérative, New EU Securitization Regulation: Impact 
on Luxemburg structures, 2018 
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5.1.1 General Framework 
 
The general framework part of the Regulation occupies the second chapter of the Regulation (EU) 
2017/2402. It spans, primarily across articles 5 to 7 with the main themes of due diligence, risk 
retention, and transparency. 
i) Due Diligence 
As part of its due diligence, the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 requires institutional investors (other 
than the original lender, the sponsor or the originator) to verify certain components of the 
securitization transaction, prior to holding a securitization position. The crucial elements include the 
credit-granting process of the originator156, the adherence and compliance of the originator to risk 
retention requirements, regular provision of required information by the originator, and the risk 
characteristic and structural traits that are to be in accordance to written processes, both to be initially 
written and those to be added on ongoing basis. If the originator or the original lender is not a firm 
established in the European Union, the due diligence is perhaps more pronounced as the credit-
granting process needs to be in compliance with ‘sound and well-defined criteria’ of creditworthiness, 
and effective credit financing systems. If on the other hand, the originator is established in the 
European Union, then the originator is obliged to disclose material information on the risk retention 
level on a continuous basis. 
The due diligence of the institutional investor extends to the thorough assessment of the risk profile 
of the securitization positions to be held, regardless  if such securitizations are supported with the 
ABCP Programme or otherwise, particularly as it affects the underlying exposures – its ‘types, the 
percentage of loans past agreed due dates, default rates, payment rates, loans in foreclosures, recovery 
rates, repurchases, loan modifications, payment holidays, collateral type and occupancy, and 
frequency distribution of credit scores or other measures of creditworthiness across underlying 
exposures, industry and geographical diversification, frequency distribution of loan to value ratios 
with bands widths that facilitate adequate sensitivity analysis’. It could also be that the underlying 
exposures themselves are securitization, and in that case, the institutional investor can extend its due 
diligence to those underlying exposures157. The due diligence equally extends to the assessment of 
the institutional investor in ascertaining the structural features of the securitization that can 
significantly affect the performance of the securitization position – the contractual priorities and 
                                                          
156 Particularly so, if such credit granting firm is not established in the European Union.  
157 Article 5, para 4(a) 
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frequency of payments and priority of payment-related triggers, credit enhancements, liquidity 
enhancement, market value triggers, and the transaction-specific definitions of default158. The due 
diligence requirement of the institutional investor, to my mind, is an encouraging, novel addition of 
the Regulation 2017/2402. The financial crisis had such devastating effect on the global financial 
system because of lack of some of the fine-details the due diligence now requires. Of course, it can 
be viewed as additional burden on the part of the institutional investors, but at the end of the day, the 
due diligence requirement increases the safety net for eventual down-turn that can ensue in 
securitization transactions. 
ii) Risk Retention 
The Regulation expects the interests of the originator, the original lender or the sponsor align with 
those of the institutional investor. To therefore attain this, the Sponsor, Originator, or the Original 
Lender is expected to retain significant net economic interest in the securitization on an ongoing basis. 
The net material economic interest is not expected to be less than 5% of the notional value of the 
origination, for off-balance sheet items. Of course, to reflect the true state of the value, the net 
economic interest is not supposed to be subject to hedging, or any credit-risk mitigation. Furthermore, 
it is only one party that is expected to have the risk retention. In the event that it turns out that there 
is no agreement on the basis for risk retention, the originator then is obligated to fulfil all the risk 
retention requirement. That way, there would not be a split that could potentially reduce the actual 
risk retention percentage of the net economic interest. In addition, to safeguarding that there is no 
split, there isn’t supposed to be any multiple applications for the retention requirement. Entities that 
are created or that operate in securitizing exposures wouldn’t be qualified to be originator. These 
requirements seem to be clearly thought-out ones by the drafters. In all, it ensures that the net risk 
retention is appropriately captured. 
Risk retention is laudable because there are number of technical procedures that originators can 
perform to weaken their risk retention profile and eventually transferring the risks to institution 
investors. In securitization transactions, risk retention can be hugely avoided with many technical 
procedures – some of which the Regulation frowns out: Split and multiple applications.  
With the benefit of hindsight from the financial crisis, one of the prime culprits is the mismatching 
of subprime assets with prime ones, thereby disproportionally transferring risks of different features 
to different classes of investors making the process less transparent and complicated. ‘Securitization 
                                                          
158 Article 5, para 3(b) 
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resulted in complex, opaque and risky financial products that caused the financial meltdown of 
2008’.159  One of the ways to forestall similar treatment, the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 prohibits 
originators from cherry-picking assets to be transferred to SSPE with the intention of ‘rendering 
losses on the assets transferred to the SSPE, measured over the life of the transaction, or over a 
maximum of 4 years where the life of the transaction is longer than four years, higher than the losses 
over the same period on comparable assets held on the balance sheet of the originator’.160 For all the 
prohibitions of risk retention, there are exceptions. The prohibitions and threshold of percentage of 
risk retention doesn’t apply where, for example, the securitized exposures are ‘fully, unconditionally 
and irrevocably guaranteed by central banks or central governments, regional governments, local 
authorities, public sector entities, national promotional banks or institutions, and multilateral 
development banks’.161 
iii) Transparency 
To forestall a reoccurrence of the events of the global financial crisis, there is, in the Regulation (EU) 
2017/2402, a higher sense of transparency and information sharing on the part of the originator, 
Sponsor, SSPE etc to the institutional investors.  For starters, the originator, sponsor or the SSPE are 
obligated to provide the investors (even before concluding or holding the securitization position) on 
a regular basis with sufficient information that are material for the informed decision of holding the 
securitization position. The frequency of the information may vary depending on the types and class 
of the securitization. For example details about the underlying exposures and documentations162 are 
vital enough to be provided to the investors, and they are to be provided on a quarterly basis. Fine 
line and details are not to be left-out, say for example, information about the description of the 
payment priority. Where an ABCP is concerned, the frequency can be on monthly basis. In addition, 
the originator, sponsor, and the SSPE have to come to an agreement about who should be designated 
                                                          
159 Ewald Engelen and Anna Glasmacher (2018)   
160 Article 6 para 2 
161 Article 6 papa 5(a),(b),(e) 
162 Important documentations like the final offering document or the prospectus together with the 
closing transaction documents, excluding legal opinions, sale agreement assignment, novation or 
transfer agreement and other relevant declaration of trust, the derivatives and guarantee agreements, 
as well as any relevant documents on collateralization arrangements where the exposures being 
securitized remain exposures of the originator; the servicing, back-up servicing, administration and 
cash management agreements; the trust deed, security deed, agency agreement, account bank 
agreement, guaranteed investment contract, incorporated terms or master trust framework or master 
definitions agreement or such legal documentation with equivalent legal value; any relevant inter-
creditor agreements, derivatives documentation, subordinated loan agreements, start-up loan 
agreements and liquidity facility agreements; 
52 
 
to provide all the information. To my mind, it is laudable that there is element of independence and 
choice of who to provide the information, however, I do believe that it is of a greater concern to the 
investors’ interest if the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 states categorically who amongst the parties 
would be responsible for what information. I hold this opinion because the roles of the parties in 
securitization transaction is defined and clear. The designation of information sharing should carry 
increased importance, in my opinion.  
The additional laudable feat of the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 is the almost compact, and 
comprehensive nature the provision of the relevant information is expected to be. There are substitutes 
and alternatives for originator, SSPE, and sponsor that may want to exploit loopholes in their status. 
For example, there is the demand for alternative information if, for instance, a prospectus has not 
been drawn. In such situation, transaction summary163 and reports are demanded164. Furthermore, the 
timing of the release of the information is also very critical to its ability to help transparency. It is 
also commendable that the Regulation envisages how appropriate the timing of the release of the 
information is.  
First, the information about all underlying documentation that is essential for the understanding of 
the transaction, and the alternative information in the absence of a prospectus are to be given before 
pricing. While information about the underlying exposures (on a quarterly and/or monthly basis, as 
the case maybe) are to be provided simultaneously each quarter at the latest one month after the due 
date for the payment of interest (and in the case of an ABCP transactions) at the latest one month 
after the end of the period of the concerning report. With these fine-details about timing, frequency 
and the comprehensive nature of the information that are to be provided to investors, the opaque 
nature of securitization in Europe is on its way to extinction, barring any other unknown technical 
procedures that is not covered by this Regulation.  
More so, the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 requires that the originator, sponsor, and SSPE make 
available the information through a securitization repository. The drafters of the Regulation foresees 
                                                          
163 Details of the alternative report and transaction summary should include details regarding the 
structure of the deal, including the structure diagrams containing an overview of the transaction, the 
cash flows and the ownership structure; details regarding the exposure characteristics, cash flows, 
loss waterfall, credit enhancement and liquidity support features; details regarding the voting rights 
of the holders of a securitization position and their relationship to other secured creditors; a list of all 
triggers and events referred to in the documents provided in accordance with point (b) that could have 
a material impact on the performance of the securitization position. 
164 Article 7, para 1(c) 
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the need to have a single, one-stop-shop where all information about the concerned securitization can 
be got.  
5.1.2 Specific Framework: STS CLASSIFICATION 
 
To understand the importance of the STS criteria, background and context is necessary. There are 
number of reason that would incentivize securitizes can get the STS tag. While Regulation (EU) 
2017/2402 gives the substantive rules, Regulation 2017/2401 deals with the prudential securitization 
and how certain institutional investors can potentially benefit from the STS securitization by giving 
comparable or corresponding rules for insurers and credit firms, for example. Regulation 2017/2401 
deals with the rules on capital requirements. Taken together, both Regulation 2017/2401 and 
Regulation 2017/2402 are significant measures in improving securitization in Europe. The STS 
classification becomes necessary to differentiate securitizations that are screened and could be 
adjudged simple, transparent, and standardized. The securitization market is still impaired, and 
somewhat suffers from stigma of its association with the financial crisis, when a securitization 
transaction is tagged STS, it is certification that such transaction is simple, transparent, and 
standardized. This means that, for example, the risks involved in a particular securitization transaction 
are assessed and adjudged appropriate. The tag helps all parties in involved in securitizations, 
especially the investors. With this tag, securitizes get ‘pass mark’ to operate securitizations that are 
more or less endorsed, in terms of regulatory certification. Hence, securitizes are motivated to get the 
STS tag. On the global level, there are coordinated efforts to see that securitizations are structured 
appropriately. An example of such global effort is the STC criteria by the BSBC-IOSCO165 taskforce. 
Merged with the European side, the global securitization market will be the better for it166. 
Snapshot of Regulation 2017/2401 
Regulation 2017/2401 is the Prudential Securitization Regulation that replaces the Capital 
Requirement Regulation. It contains, amongst other things, the prudential treatment and differentiated 
capital requirements for institutional investors like banks and investment companies how they can 
probably benefit from favourable regulatory capital treatment for STS securitization exposures. For 
example, in Article 206 of the Regulation 2017/2401, for securitizations that are STS compliant, 
there’s a special treatment for the risk calculation, i.e. the risk-weight floor for senior securitization 
                                                          
165 Respectively, the joint effort signifies the work of Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and 
the Board Of International Organization of Securities Commissions. The scope and a recent press 
briefing on the joint effort is available at https://www.bis.org/press/p180514.htm 
166 European Commission (2018) 
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positions is 10%. Furthermore, in article 264 of the same regulation, for STS-tagged securitization 
positions, there is special treatment for the exposures that are on short and long term basis. This acts 
as motivation of securitizes to get the STS tag. 
So Regulation 2017/2401 amends Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 by inserting, replacing, or deleting 
appropriate points. For example Article 4(1) is amended by replacing points (13) and (14) with 
appropriate definition of ‘originator’ and ‘sponsor’, and insertion like ‘original lender’ are made. It 
equally covers treatment of securitization positions (article 109), definitions and criteria for simple, 
transparent and standardized securitizations (article 242), criteria for STS securitizations qualifying 
for differentiated capital treatment (article 243), recognition of significant risk transfer, (article 244)  
synthetic securitization, operational requirements for early amortization provisions (article 246) and 
the calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts. As a whole, it acts as background that seamlessly 
connect Regulation 2017/2402. 
Regulation 2017/2402 Specific Framework for STS classification 
The other leg of the Regulation 2017/2402 bothers on specific requirement for securitization 
transactions that are ‘simple, transparent, and standardized. With the specific framework of the 
Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, it is easier to have a harmonized, and a more risk-sensitive prudential 
framework across the region, EU-wide. The trio of opaque, complex, and lack of standardization 
features of securitization played a vital role in the financial crisis, hence the specific framework of 
the Regulation tackling these tripartite problem is very laudable. In order for a securitization 
transaction to be classified as a ‘simple, transparent, and standardized’, it has to pass number of 
criteria. Predominantly, each of the sub-headings have their areas of specialization. For example, the 
sub-heading simplicity concerns portfolio and cash flows, while transparency concerns investor data 
availability, and standardization concerns structural elements. For the tag of STS to apply, the 




Figure 7: Summary of the Simple, Transparency, Standardization (STS) criteria. Source: 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Société cooperative (Luxemburg, 2018) 
 
It is noteworthy to state that the framework doesn’t in itself implies that the STS securitization 
position is entirely free of risks, or a rubber stamp for prime status for the underlying assets, it shows 
that a cautious and diligent institutional investor will be in a better position to analyze the risks 
involved in the securitization. There are at least three classifications of the criteria: the STS criteria, 
the additional requirements, and the third party verification. 
Simplicity 
The requirements relating to simplicity demand that the title to the underlying exposures is only to be 
acquired by the means of true sale, assignment or transfer with the same legal effect in the manner 
that is enforceable against the seller or any other third. This corresponds to Article 20 of the 
regulation. This requirement is beneficial on many fronts: it compensates for the lack of simplicity 
that surrounds the title and responsibilities of SSPE. Now, with this requirement, it means that when 
a transfer of tittle is effected to the SSPE it will not be subjected to clawback167 provisions, should 
                                                          
167 Clawback means a clause that are included in agreements (especially financial agreements) 
whereby money already paid must be retuned where certain conditions are met. Clawback provisions 
can come in various forms. According the Regulation, the following will be assumed to the clawback 
provision: provisions which allow the liquidator of the seller to invalidate the sale of the underlying 
exposures solely on the basis that it was concluded within a certain period before the declaration of 
the seller’s insolvency, provisions where the SSPE can only prevent the invalidation referred to in 
point (a) if it can prove that it was not aware of the insolvency of the seller at the time of sale. 
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there be insolvency of the seller. The essence of this requirement, to my mind, helps clears the 
ambiguity surrounding the legal entity and the nature of the liability of parties in the transfer of title. 
It is particularly beneficial in that, in the case where there are many intermediaries between the seller 
and SSPE (or where there is no direct transfer of title between SSPE and the seller) that the same 
legal effect is applicable in each of the steps. Understandably the national insolvency laws of member 
states will play significant role in the adjudication of insolvency, if it happens in in securitization, 
however, the idea is to create simplicity in the treatment of transfer of title of underlying exposures 
to show fairness.  
In addition, the regulation’s specific clauses of no active portfolio management, the homogenous 
assets types, the ban on re-securitization, no default exposures, and cash flow not substantially 
dependent on sale of asset, and at one payment make otherwise complex nature of securitization to 
be simplified. For example, when underlying exposures are transferred from the seller to the SPPE, 
it is expected to ‘meet predetermined, clear and documented eligibility criteria which do not allow 
for active portfolio management of those exposures on a discretionary’168, and to be sure, accepted 
securitization by the Regulation only accepts pool of underlying assets that are of the same features 
(particularly in the areas of cash flow of the assets, contractual credit-risk and prepayment 
characteristics), and the underlying exposures are to be contractually binding and enforceable.  
Transparency 
To open the inner workings of securitization and holding its position, there is need for data to be 
available for institutional investors to make informed decisions. This requirement is a landmark 
development compared to the pre-financial crisis era. The Regulation requires historical default and 
loss performance data, the need to have sample of exposure independently verified, the need to have 
liability cash flow model to be linked to the concern exposure, the responsibility of the originator and 
sponsor to make sure that transparency is made by making frequent, regular reports. The requirement 
makes sure that at least 5 years of data to be made available. The length of time is ideal. Five years 
seems a reasonably fair time frame that indicate the average performance of a firm – this way 
exceptional circumstances that could affect the performance of the firm is easily noticed. Apart from 
the length of time the data should be provided, it should comprehensive – containing the dynamic and 
static data, and information that the data provide must be similar to assets that are to be securitized. 
This inclusion is very necessary. Whereas if neither of the type of data is required, odds are that the 
firm can provide information that is less useful for the potential investor. Static data, by nature, are 
                                                          
168 Article 20 (7) 
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fixed, while dynamic are variable. If static data of five years are presently, it will give an inaccurate 
picture. On the other hand, if dissimilar data that is unconnected to the assets to be securitized is 
provided, it contribute little or nothing to the sound decision the investor is expected to make. Hence, 
the comprehensive nature and similarity of the data to be provided is impressive. 
Transparency is increased if sample is subject to external verification, or the cash flow model denotes 
the contractual relationship between the underlying exposures and the payments flowing between the 
relevant parties – the originator, SSPE, investors, and third – and thereafter made available to the 
investor on a continues basis.169 Here, as plausible as the use of an external verification sounds, there 
are at least two noticeable drawbacks it can bring. First is the ‘authenticity’ of the report of the 
external verification. My reservation is premised on the fact of the role rating agencies played in the 
financial crisis. Of course, ‘external verification’ can be compromised. Rating agencies tag many sub-
prime mortgages as prime before the bubble burst in the financial crisis. With the benefit of hindsight, 
external verification is good, but the process can be compromised. Second is the transactional costs. 
It is not clear from the Regulation if the cost of the external verification is borne by the investor or 
by the originator or the SSPE or even competent national authorities in the member states. Either 
way, the cost of the external verification is mostly likely factored in the securitization, and likely 
passed on to the investor. 
Standardization  
The standardization phase of the STS criteria bothers on structural elements. It requires that the risk 
retention part of the Regulation must be adhered to by the originator, and sponsor. It expects that the 
currency risks and interest risks be mitigated. This has multifaceted benefits. On the surface, it helps 
bring standardization, but, deeply, it goes into the heart of investor protection and transparency. SSPE 
are particularly prohibited for entering into derivative contracts or transaction, and their pool of 
underlying exposures are not expected to have derivatives, except for the purpose of hedging interest-
rate and currency risk. This requirement seems laudable, but somewhat contradictory. It is fine to 
have standardized securitization structure (prohibiting derivatives of the underlying exposure), but 
this could be easily manipulated. Every attempt to make re-securitization from the back door (and in 
fact, making derivatives of underlying exposures) can be lumped under the exception: ‘’for currency 
and interest-rates hedging’’. Thus, as laudable as this section of the Regulation is, it can be, to my 
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mind, easily manipulated. It is good that the interest rate to be referenced should be known and 
common ones, without complex calculations.  
 In addition, the tasks and roles of the parties (particularly those of the servicer) involved in the 
securitization need be clearly described and disclosed. Securitization process also will be a lot more 
standardized when remedies and actions in case of default of debtors or conflicts of investors are 
predefined.  
Sundry, Addition Requirements 
After fulfilling the STS criteria described above, originator, Sponsor, and SSPE must be established 
in the European Union, and all the STS are to be published in a list on the official website of the 
ESMA170, and the originator and Sponsor shall jointly notify ESMA of the new STS securitization 
and to verify the level of compliance of the STS criteria. 
Third party verification 
Originator, Sponsor and SSPE may use the service of an authorized third party to check whether a 
securitization complies with the STS criteria. However, the use of such a service shall not under any 
circumstances affect the liability of the Originator, Sponsor or SSPE in respect of their legal 









                                                          
170 ESMA is the European Securities and Markets Authority.  
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6.  Major Regulatory and Legal Challenges of Securitization in Europe and 
Specific Concerns of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402   
 
No doubt, securitization has many benefits. With the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 coming into force 
at the beginning of 2019, the landscape of securitization in Europe will take a new, different shape. 
The events culminating into the financial crisis, especially the agonizing memories of the effects of 
securitization of sub-prime mortgages, it is understandably hard to envisage the possible gains of 
securitization. The start and the spread of the sub-prime mortgage crisis, as powered by securitization, 
to its eventual culmination into full-fledge financial crisis, has witnessed considerable amount of 
economic downturn. The mortgage originators played a crucial role in the eventual crisis. Main major 
fault of the mortgage originators is the somewhat sub-par underwriting standards. On the one hand, 
the mortgage originators were quite aggressive in sourcing potential home buyers (to, understandably, 
increase the stream of cash flow for the pool), and on the other hand, a weak underwriting standard. 
With the benefit of hindsight, the reasons for the stance of mortgage originators (without possibly 
discounting the roles of the rating agencies in rating sub-prime mortgages as prime ones), can at least 
be three – the pricing dynamics of housing, interest rate mechanism of the Federal Reserve, and the 
balance sheet effects to the originators.171 
As seemingly beneficial as securitization is, there are major concerns about the legal and regulatory 
challenges it brings to bare, especially when it is structured in international or transnational context. 
The financial crisis demonstrates this fact that the sophistication and how securitization is structured 
has implication for many branches of law. The immediate implication, most glaringly, is securities 
law. In addition securitization affects other aspect of law, for examples – tort liability, bankruptcy 
law, and sundry legal doctrines, for instance, substance-over-form doctrines. This is not creating the 
impression that these challenges are peculiar to securitization, or that other types of financial 
innovation do not have challenges, however, securitization displays these challenges in a rather higher 
magnitude.  Notable challenges that can come with cross-border or transnational securitizations 
include interlaying relationships and the problems of establishing liability, bankruptcy law and its 
application, its definition as a financial innovation moving towards a legal concept, and its heavy 
reliance on substance.  
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Securitization and Bankruptcy Law 
With Securitization as one of the leading forces of financial markets172 and representing a major form 
of financing, and with a prospect of doing more in the US market, it is concerning that it seems the 
law, as they seem to be today, are not overtly equipped for tackle some issues surrounding the use 
and application of securitization. One area of such concerns in bankruptcy law. Understandably, the 
idea of the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 is to somewhat bridge the gap inherent in securitization and 
law, however, a lot still have to be done. Starting from the very intent of securitization – getting 
alternative financing means, sort of a low-cost capital, that are not typically available in conventional 
means – it is to be noted that legal provisions ought to be in the relatively novel form to match the 
challenges that will be coming from securitizations, a novel but sophisticated financial product, itself.  
In addition, securitization is expected to provide a platform that, in the event of the originator’s 
bankruptcy, the stream of payments, i.e receivables, are to be separated from the originator. Thus the 
SPV plays a vital role in the separation of the originator’s estate in the event of bankruptcy. Drawing 
up the interplay of bankruptcy and the wat securitization works, in the event of bankruptcy of the 
originator, the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) buys the assets of the originator and issues securities 
backed by the stream of payments. In Bankruptcy law, the purchase of the asset of the originator is 
compared to ‘true sale’, essentially allowing the estate of the originator to be separated in the 
bankruptcy proceeding173. 
In addition, another way the originator estate can be separated in the event of bankruptcy of the 
originator is to maintain, as it were, the SPV as a distinct, separate entity. When necessary 
requirements are fulfilled and the accomplying documents are updated, corporate statute of entities 
can guarantee that the SPV is separated from the originator’s estate. Now, here is the challenge – how 
about if the SPV is the one filling its own bankruptcy suit? While this is a very valid worry, it can be 
prevented by having a procedural safeguard or measure. For instance, at the point of setting up the 
SPV, an internal corporate code may demand that all the directors of the SPV must unanimously 
agree on the ability or willingness of the SPV to personally file for bankruptcy. Thus, an external, 
independent director whose interests, particularly fiduciary interest, does not align with the rest of the 
board can be appointed. Thus, when there are no uniform interest, the possibility of colluding reduces. 
So the interests of the board is split into the shareholders’ and the investors’ – the SPV174. In addition, 
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there can also be the strict performance obligation of the SPV to concentrates only on the immediate 
securitization purpose. When the SPV is not working outside the scope of the special purpose it is 
created for, it reduces the possibility of involuntary bankruptcy filing. When the SPV is directly 
involved in creditors other than those that are holding the issued securities, the possibility of filling 
for involuntary bankruptcy increases. It appears a bit contradictory that, if securitization was set up, 
in the first place by the originator, to prevent impeding bankruptcy, regulatory or corporate procedural 
code will allow it for bankruptcy to happen. Summarily, challenges emerge when the conventional 
doctrines are applied to securitizations. For example, as Kingston Square Associates175 reveals, 
                                                          
175 ‘’an influential bankruptcy court held that a debtor may orchestrate an involuntary bankruptcy 
petition for the purpose of avoiding bankruptcy remote bylaw provisions, gave the financial world 
reason to pause and reconsider the integrity of its various securitization transactions. The case 
involves an MBS – a mortgage-backed securities, just as in the case of the subprime mortgage of the 
financial crisis. 
‘’ The significant parties in Kingston Square included two trustees, eleven debtors (all eleven debtors 
were controlled by the same person, the "principal"), and seven creditors who each filed an 
involuntary bankruptcy petition against the debtors.39 The trustees represented investors who were 
the beneficiaries of mortgage pass-through certificates issued by the debtors in a securitization 
transaction.' The mortgage certificates were similar to debentures in that they entitled the beneficiaries 
to a stream of future payments. For the purpose of securing the approximately $277,000,000 the 
trustees spent purchasing the pass through certificates, they took a mortgage on various properties 
owned by the debtors. As part of the securitization, the debtors inserted "bankruptcy remote" 
provisions in their bylaws.42 The provisions required a unanimous vote of the directors in order to 
file a voluntary bankruptcy petition.43 In conjunction with the unanimity requirement, the provisions 
also called for an independent director" whose purpose was, in part, to prevent the required unanimous 
agreement for the filing of a voluntary bankruptcy petition, thereby making the likelihood of a filing 
virtually nonexistent.' As the result of a default on the pass-through certificates, the trustees instituted 
foreclosure proceedings on all of the properties securing the certificates." The only way that the 
debtors were able to halt the foreclosures was through the filing of a bankruptcy petition and availing 
themselves of the protections of the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay. Due to the bankruptcy remote 
provisions in the bylaws, the principal had to consider methods other than a voluntary petition to get 
each of the debtors into bankruptcy. In spite of the fact that the parties to the transaction specifically 
structured the securitization to avoid bankruptcy and did so at the behest of the principal, the principal 
gathered a group of "friendly" creditors for the purpose of orchestrating an involuntary petition 
against each of the debtors whom he controlled. The trustees moved for a dismissal pursuant to section 
1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, arguing that each of the involuntary petitions was the result of 
collusion and therefore filed in bad faith. They argued that the principal "initiated, funded and 
identified seven friendly creditors to prosecute the involuntary petitions so each [d]ebtor could obtain 
improper leverage against the [trustees] by gaining access to the bankruptcy court without violating 
the bankruptcy restrictions in the bylaws of the various [d]ebtors."5 On the other hand, the petitioning 
creditors, in union with the debtors, claimed that seeking bankruptcy protection was their only means 
to (i) preserve any chance of recovery on their claims ... before the [trustees] foreclosed on the assets 
of each [d]ebtor, (ii) challenge the validity of the [trustees'] claims, and (iii) find a third party to fund 
a plan of reorganization or purchase the properties, which would result in a greater recovery to all 
parties than would be obtained from the pending foreclosures. These arguments made by the 
petitioners appear to have some merit on their face but should be viewed in light of the following: 
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although a US decided case, securitization is somewhat peculiar that the direct application of 
conventional doctrines may become worrying.  
The formation of a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) is primarily intended to be able to protect invest 
in the securities, although it may have a similar structure to any typical corporation. Thus, there is a 
danger of treating an SPV as any other corporation in certain matters, for instance in bankruptcy 
issues. While typical corporations are set up for the maximization of profits and wealth for its owners, 
the SPV aims at protecting its investors. Maximizing wealth doesn’t fit into the narratives when, as 
often as it is, the sole shareholder of the SPV is the originator. This marked difference explains the 
                                                          
The seven creditors the principal assembled for the purpose of this orchestration consisted of two 
trade creditors and five professional organizations (such as law firms and a consulting firm) whose 
overall debt was not significant enough to cause them, on their own, to file an involuntary petition 
prior to the solicitation by the principal.  In addition, the principal paid a law firm to do the work, and 
several of the creditors were only willing to join in the filing of the involuntary petitions on the 
condition that the principal would handle all legal fees and administrative matters. One of the 
creditors had already written off the debt as "uncollectible,"' and only one of the creditors had taken 
any action beyond sending invoices to enforce its legal rights prior to the filing." Moreover, the 
assertion with respect to a greater recovery for all creditors excluded the largest body of creditors, the 
investors represented by the trustees, who had approximately $277,000,000 at stake. Finally, as the 
court noted: "Since these cases commenced, the Petitioning Creditors have exhibited no interest in 
what has been transpiring. And, of the seven individual creditors comprising the Petitioning Creditors, 
at least three had no knowledge of who was footing the bill for the legal expenses. 
 
On this set of facts, the court correctly noted that "[a]t first blush, these cases seem ripe for dismissal." 
However, that statement is the closest the court came to acknowledging the questionable tactics 
employed 
…by the principal. Aside from the fact that the case appeared "ripe" for dismissal, the court noted 
that "within the boundaries of well settled principles, a bankruptcy judge has wide discretion to 
determine if cause exists and how ultimately to dispose of the case.""8 Although that observation is 
true and would seemingly help to facilitate a just result, the court's opinion did not analyze the forces 
underlying this type of transaction, nor did it consider how ill-suited the case may be for adjudication 
based on "well-settled principles." Under this approach, the court's ensuing analysis tried to solve a 
new problem with old solutions and reached what many will argue is an erroneous decision, a model 
of form over substance… The Kingston court acknowledged that debtor orchestration of involuntary 
petitions is indicative of bad faith, but it held that orchestration standing alone is not enough for a bad 
faith dismissal based on collusion." As previously discussed, collusion requires concert of action and 
a fraudulent or deceitful purpose. According to the court, the orchestration of the petitions in this case 
satisfies the concert of action element of the test for collusion. However, since the concert of action 
was not for the purpose of avoiding a previous court order or in contravention of a statute, the court 
was unwilling to find the necessary fraudulent or deceitful purpose. The court interpreted "fraudulent 
or deceitful purpose" to mean "wrongful purpose."’’ - Michael J. Cohn (1998) Asset Securitization: 





dynamics in the use of securitization and bankruptcy. This further buttresses the legal and regulatory 
challenges inherent in the use of securitization.  
Naturally, asset-backed securities (ABS) have the distinct feature that makes them different from 
other contracts, for example secured debt. This feature, as explained above, makes ABS realize 
bankruptcy remoteness176. So the relationship securitization and bankruptcy law is such that, as 
explained above, more often than not, securitizations cannot be subjected to bankruptcy proceedings. 
Viewed from another angle, the traditional bankruptcy is somewhat restricted in securitization, 
particularly in cases that bankruptcy is replaced with specific liquidation proceedings.177 This is 
because in securitization, when an SPV is set up, it is not unusual to have a structural guarantee that 
liquidation will be preceded by signs of distress than those actually lead to bankruptcy.  One way to 
have it done is to have some caveat in the transaction document. Examples of earlier signs of distress 
could be when there is declining quality in the underlying assets pooled together, or when there is a 
downward review by rating agencies, but the real liquidation is when the value of liabilities exceed 
those of the assets. Furthermore, the party that performs the liquidation process is often not appointed 
by the court but is always a trustee who exercises the liquidation on behalf of the investors. With 
these marked differences in the conventional and securitization bankruptcy or liquidation processes, 
it is therefore a valid regulatory or legal challenge in adapting conventional bankruptcy principles in 
securitization cases and contracts. It is safe to infer that the specificities of how securitizations are 
structured do not have sufficient bankruptcy principles to match.     
Securitization and Tort Liability 
Securitization can be sophisticated and complex. A complete simple securitization can have layers of 
actors that paly different roles in interrelated and interdependent contracts. So a distinct feature, there 
are actors and players in a securitization contract. It is always in an interconnected web of 
relationships between the actors and the parties involved in securitization. In a typical securitization 
contract, there is the sponsor who most time doubles as the originator (but not compulsorily so, 
because there are instances that the sponsor is not the originator), the servicer and the depositor, the 
trustee (as mentioned above, who could be responsible for the liquidation of the Vehicle if 
circumstances necessitate such), underwriters and rating agencies, and the investors. These actors and 
                                                          
176 Bankruptcy remote firms are those that are created to perform special project and separating 
financial risk and minimizing bankruptcy risks. They are typically prevented from incurring debts 
and obligations. They are also designed in a way that the bankruptcy has a little economic impact on 
the overall (or other) companies that it may be part of.  
  
177 Law of Transnational Securitization (2009)  
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parties paly different role in the smooth operation of a standard, typical securitization contract. In this 
interrelated web of players, when something goes wrong and there are losses at the end of the day, 
the investors only have contract with the SPV, which often time don’t offer support. Should investors 
try to recover the loss via litigation, they can but establishing liability of the SPV in tort implies that 
the investors have to prove, at the very least, the dual failings of the SPV – false statements from the 
SPV that inaccurately coerced them into investing in the transaction, and either fraud or negligence 
on the part of the SPV while carrying out their duties. Either way, it is difficult in establishing liability. 
In addition, there valid questions as to the interrelationships of the parties in terms of liabilities owe 
the investors. It is pertinent to ask if the parties involved in securitization have obligations to the 
investors. If indeed there are obligations, what constituents these duties? Who assigns them? Should 
they be standard procedure or to vary alongside the peculiarities of deals and securitization 
transaction? Understandably, these questions align with the investors protection motive and 
ultimately to the desired improvement of securitization and the intent of the Regulation EU 
2017/4202.  
Securitization and Substance-over-form 
Understandably there are number of traditional doctrines of substance-over-form178 that can be used 
in securitization. For instance, most SPVs are not sufficiently capitalized, and there have strong ties 
with the sponsor, and it is not unusual for the sponsor to be involved in the asset servicing, and often 
(with a posed stance in case of a possible default of the underlying assets) provide credit enhancement. 
However, in spite of these known features of securitization, it doesn’t seem to be problematic yet for 
securitization. These features are what are considered in the conventional doctrines of substance-
over-form, such as recharacterization of asset sales as secured transaction, veil-piercing, substance 
consolidation. This does portend some legal challenge for securitization. 
Securitization and adopting the right legal nomenclature  
There is some legal challenge to the way securitization can be described legally. This is because there 
are number of financial transactions and contracts that take the form of the idea of securitization but 
they are not directly termed thus. Getting the appropriate terminology for securitization (and perhaps 
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all other contracts and transactions looking thus. Securitization, being entirely a financial innovation 
and portend somewhat small legal challenge in providing the appropriate name. In addition, as a 
market and economic concept which is comparatively less widespread, there is the regulatory and 
legal challenge in concretizing it into a legal concept. 
 
6.1 A critical Analysis of the implication of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 on European 
Securitization Market 
 
The Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 is laudable in many respects. There are however critical implication 
for the European Securitization market going forward. The European Commission’s Capital Market 
Union has done quite remarkable job with the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, particularly with the 
provisions to tackle the parts of the problems of securitization – lack of transparency and complexity. 
With the STS-securitization guidelines, a lot of improvement, security and confidence is expected in 
the European Securitization market. There are however legit concerns about the implication of the 
Regulation (EU) 2017/2402. I loosely categorize these concerns into two – the seeming difference 
between the narratives and contents, and sundry concerns. Under the sundry concerns, I identify 
potential implications and differences that will occur in the European Securitization Market, going-
forward by January 2019. Under the discrepancy concerns, I identify ways that the narratives about 
the STS-securitization are seemingly different from the realities that will take place. Also specific 
elements of the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 as well as the overall securitization regulatory changes 
are critiqued. For example, due diligence, retention, capital requirements, and the rating systems are 
critiqued. 
The Concerns and Implications around Discrepancies 
There seem to be noticeable discrepancy between the heralded intents of the CMU via the Regulation 
(EU) 2017/2402 and, in reality, what the Regulation will achieve. In the first place, the Capital Market 
Union (CMU) conceived the idea of the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, in connection to the overall post-
crisis intervention in the EU. For example, the CMU is concerned about the overall mobilization of 
capital in Europe and make the financial system across Europe to be resilient179, and in particular in 
the reflection paper of May 2017 about the deepening of the economic and monetary union, the 
                                                          
179 EC’s webpage 
66 
 
reflection paper expects the amendments of the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, with the hope that it will 
facilitate future securitization.180181 
Compared to the US, the post-crisis intervention in the EU, particularly the Eurozone, is somewhat 
underachieving182. The noticeable difference in the outcome and performance between US and the 
Eurozone post-crisis intervention, amidst many other reasons, is the over-reliance of the European 
banks on bank loans as against the US’ system of market lending.183 This means that after the financial 
crisis of 2008, many European banks were preoccupied with rebuilding their balance sheets, which 
the process, undermine their ability to solidly finance the Small-and-Medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs). There is thus an urgent need to find a way to get an alternative financing medium and, using 
the US model, market-based lending arrangement seems appealing. The CMU, then, being in the 
main center of coordinating effective financial system across Europe needed to bring innovative 
financial techniques to bear, and open the financial markets via the stocks and bond markets. For 
example, in Germany, the real estates market is somewhat underdeveloped184 and as such 
securitization portends to be a veritable tool to bring about the desirable turnaround, in line with the 
mission of the CMU. Thus to remodel the financing across Europe, the Commission tries to integrate 
European capital markets as much as practicable, standardize and harmonize the processes in the 
capital market185, reduce the bureaucracies and redtapism around the capital market, and also 
revamping the European securitization market.186 In addition to the compelling drive of the CMU to 
revamp the European securitization market, there are, on the other hand, other motivations to get 
securitization back on its feet, post-crisis. These motivations take the coloration of functions and 
politics. Political and functional reasons187 that support the revitalization of the European 
securitization market can best explained as, for example, home owners and real estates market 
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181 Gabor and Vestergaard (2018) 
182 Engelen and Glasmacher (2018) 
183 Ibid 
184 Compared to other markets with similar size of the economy, Germany wasn’t doing well in the 
Real estates market, comparatively. 
185 For example, according to Engelen and Glasmacher, 2018, the process revamped include 
harmonized rule books for share and bond emission, prospectuses, and peer-to-peer lending. 
186 Engelen and Glasmacher (2018) 
187 Engelen and Glasmacher, 2018 believe that ‘financialized real estate markets create their own 
political support once they reached a certain threshold’ thus that stands as a sufficient political and 
functional reason to want the revamping of the securitization market. This personally makes sense to 
me: in that, after the financial crisis, and the identified problem of over reliance on European banks 
for financing of the SMEs, the securitization market offers an alternative funding mechanism. This 
tallies with possible socio-economic motivation for the revamping of the European securitization 
market.   
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participants who have economic incentives, would like to support the continuation of the 
securitization market, never minding the confluence of such intent with the CMU’s mission.188 
It is not unusual to have elements of governance through the financial market189. It does seem that the 
CMU is using its mandate of providing effective financial system of Europe, via policies of course, 
to achieve governing. To my mind, that’s fine. As an American-style strategy, governing through the 
financial market entails the use policy goals that transcend the initial institutional capacity. In doing 
this, the CMU ‘seeks realize a long-standing goal of the European policy makers: a financial system 
in which capital markets will absorb more citizens’ savings and play a greater role in corporate 
finance’, also increasing ‘market-based banking, which also entails reviving the European 
securitization market’.190 Thus, it is safe to conclude that the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, albeit 
indirectly, is intended to be used to revamp the securitization market (which to my mind is good), 
however as a governing through the financial market technique.  
Thus the naming of this section ‘concerns discrepancies’. On the one hand, it seems the Commission, 
via the CMU, gives the narratives that the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 is about having the STS-
securitization, on the other hand, it is equally safe to deduce from the regulation that it can subtly be 
used as an alternative financing for European SMEs. It further gives the impression of a possible 
power play – the plausible interests carefully hidden behind the narratives and the contents of the 
Regulation.191 
So far, as laudable as the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 is, particularly the STS-securitization, another 
known discrepancy is the fact that the regulation seems to deal with the ‘quantity’ of securitization. 
In other words the STS-securitization deals with the process of how securitization is carried out with 
the reference to the tranching, structuring, distribution, and rating but little or nothing is done with 
the ‘quality’, as it were, of the securitization itself. This implies that the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 
has limited impact on the mortgage contracts themselves, since securitization is largely in form of 
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189 Braun et al., 2018 
190 Braun B, Gabor D and Hu¨bner M (2018) Governing through financial markets: Towards a 
critical political economy of Capital Markets Union. Competition and Change 
191‘’ Decision making in many policy domains is controlled by well-organized interest groups which 
tell ‘trade narratives’ that refer to public goods in order to obscure the private interests behind them 
(Bowman et al., 2017; Engelen, 2017). There is now a sizeable and growing literature that aims to 
explain the gap between narrative and facts as the outcome of power asymmetries. There is not only 
power in (policy) ideas, but also through and over them. In the latter two instances ideas are used to 
seduce or manipulate audiences into believing that private actions do indeed serve public values while 
they are actually harming them (see Carstensen and Schmidt, 2015; Engelen, 2017).’’ 
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derivatives hinged on an underlying assets. To my mind, while it is commendable that the regulation, 
particularly the frameworks on the STS-securitization, tend to increase the transparency, 
standardization, and simplicity about securitization, the underlying foundations and the contract the 
transactions are hinged upon are not so much impacted.192 Examples that readily come to mind will 
be the absence of sections in the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402  that tries curtailing predatory lending193 
and ‘’socially unsustainable investment. This is so because of there is no limit (according to the 
Regulation (EU) 2017/2402) ‘for loan-to-value or loan-to-income for the mortgages to be eligible for 
STS securitizations, even though these are the most important indicators for risk in mortgage 
lending’.194 Understandably, high loan-to-value mortgage lending can be an innovative, fast-growing 
avenue of consumer finance, but it comes with great costs, to the economy and to the lenders195. When 
the lending policies and the management practices of lending (either high or low loan-to-value) is not 
considered in the eligibility of securitization according to the Regulation, then, that is concerning. 
This doesn’t show significant difference from what was obtainable pre-crisis in the securitization 
market. 
Another discrepancy is the label and what is obtainable. The tag STS-securitization presupposes the 
process and regulatory framework with will simple. The regulation’s requirement doesn’t seem 
simple with a lot of complex requirements. This observation tend to be commonplace.196 By its very 
nature, being a form of derivative financing, securitization is traditionally complex, to the extent that, 
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193 Practices and action that make the lender better off on the account of the borrower by carefully 
and deceitfully hiding details as fees, interest-rates etc. 
194 Engelen and Glasmacher, 2018 
195 Calomiris etal (1999) 
196 ‘When the proposals for STS came along, I was a bit bemused as to how a set of such complex 
proposals could be labelled simple’. Rob Ford, TwentyFour Asset Management, Financial Times, 23 
March 2016. Furthermore, Engelen and Glasmacher, 2018 perhaps pictures the discrepancy better. ‘’ 
To illustrate their inherent complexity, take the passage that stipulates the types of documents that 
the different parties in any securitization (originators, structurers, sponsors, the managers of the 
special purpose vehicles used in securitization) have to provide to investors in order to fulfil 
transparency requirements. This adds up to a long list indeed, covering 
more than four pages of the document, suggesting an ultimate file that could easily add up to more 
than a thousand pages, and would inevitably contain speculative assumptions about future risks, 
returns and macroeconomic conditions as well as open legal clauses such as ‘in good faith’. 
Furthermore, the document explicitly requires the inclusion of interest and foreign exchange swaps 
in STS securitizations to manage interest and currency risks. However, derivatives hugely complicate 
the risk-and-return profile of any financial product, increase counterparty-risk and hence systemic 
instability, and allow banks to lever up their trading and banking books. As such, the draft proposal 
reads as if the notion of STS securitization has been stretched to ‘cover’ the industry practices that 




by the framework of the regulation, securitization is now made for institutional investors and 
professionals. It is because of the inherent risks and complexities that informed the exclusion of retail 
investors. To my mind it seems there is a discrepancy between the nomenclature and the eventual 
reality of the securitization. 
More subtle but nonetheless a discrepancy, is the fact of who actually benefits from the Regulation 
(EU) 2017/2402. As it stands, it is tempting to conclude that the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402  favours 
investors, and perhaps the entire financial landscape of Europe, however, on a more discerning look, 
there seems to be particular interests other than the most obvious. This is premise on the fact that it 
is possible for proposals that eventually gets to be Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 to be a function of cross 
ventilations of ideas, until a group consensus is made from the pool of ideas. This arrangement, called 
the ‘garbage can’ model of decision making197gives an impression that the outcome may not 
necessarily be the best idea, but just a reached consensus.  
The proposals that eventually culminated into the Regulation seemed to have passed that process. It 
does seem that ulterior motives (or interests) are better served than the ones purported through the 
STS-securitization and the Regulation, because, more often than not, a proposal that culminates into 
a policy (as in this case, Regulation (EU) 2017/2402) could be arrived at if it serves particular interests 
of a larger coalition. This is because using this approach, consensus, ‘coalition, narratives, 
contingencies and brokering are at the heart of this view of policy making, not rationality, problem 
solving, engineering, puzzling’’.198 The solution that STS-securitization proffers could extensively 
be serving the interests of European policy makers, central bankers, national banking associations, 
and regulators. While this may sound like a conspiracy theory, there seems to be evidence that these 
interests may as well be the ones being served by the STS-securitization. 
First off, for the European policy makers, there are evidences that some of the policies in the EU are 
tailored, in some instances, after the US-model. For example, the overall Lisbon agenda, which one 
of its core objective is to ‘investing more knowledge and innovation’199 tend to be fashioned against 
the US venture capital-model of technological innovation seen in Silicon Valley200 and the Services 
                                                          
197 March and Olsen’s (1989) 
198 Engelen and Glasmacher, 2018 and March and Olsen’s (1989) 
199 European Committee on the Region (2005) 
200 Engelen and Glasmacher, 2018 
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Directive of 2006201 takes the semblance of American shareholder-ideology202 and the overall internal 
market arrangement of the EU copies, to a large extent the federal nature of the United States203.  
It is safe to conclude that the noticeable difference in the performance of the post-crisis interventions 
of the US and Europe could inform the subtle adoption of the STS-securitization as against what it is 
purported to serve. Secondly, there have been attempts by national banking associations – with the 
examples of Germany204, Britain and the Netherlands205 – with the intent to make securitizations to 
be more appealing to investors, a the seeming outcome that the STS-securitization, and by extension 
the Regulation. In Germany, for instance, the True Sale International206 in Germany almost drive the 
securitization market of the German economy. It was initially founded by the association of national 
banks in Germany (at least 13 of them)207 and nowadays with more partners in ‘banks, consulting 
firms, service providers, law firms, rating agencies and business associations’, which tallies with the 
same intent of the financial market promotion  plan208. It doesn’t feel like a coincidence that ideas of 
association of banks in Germany and those of the STS-securitization tally. It is most likely as a result 
of subtle agenda guised in the form of STS-securitization. Thirdly, the central bankers also tend to be 
culpable in the seeming discrepancy. This seen from the perspective where post crisis intervention of 
central bankers (in this instance, the ECB and the BOE) tend to be on the concentration on ‘negligent 
risk management rather than on concerns such as misallocation of credit, asset bubbles and other 
microprudential issues, as occasioned by the May 2014 Bank of England/ECB Discussion.209  
Closely related to the central bankers, are the roles regulators (especially The European Banking 
Authority) also play in the discrepancy. For example, while highlighting the benefits of securitization, 
there is little or nothing that is mentioned in the complicity of securitization in the financial crisis. 
Either it is deliberate or an oversight, it gels with the idea that the drawbacks of securitization are 
deliberately ignored in the quest to sell the STS-securitization agenda. Further concerning is the fact 
that before the eventual tag of STS-securitization, the EBA supports the initiative to have a centralized 
European securitization standard via ‘’Prime Collateralized Securities initiative’’ (PCS). The worry 
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207 Engelen and Glasmacher (2018) 
208 Ibid 
209 Engelen and Glasmacher (2018) provides more information on the role of the Bank of England 
and the ECB, in a possible intentional creating the discrepancy. 
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is the play on words – Prime to mitigate Subprime – a word that it clearly associated with the financial 
crisis.210 These concerns show discrepancy in the way the intent of securitization is projected than 
what, empirically analyzing, it is in reality.  
In the same vein, major elements of the regulation (EU) 2017/2402 can be individually critiqued. For 
example, Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 emphasizes disclosure, but it is doubtful if increased disclosure can 
ultimately by itself result in better securitization transaction. I arrive at this position because, pre-crisis, 
disclosure were demanded for securitization transaction, and still we had the financial crisis. Some 
securitization transaction are rather complex that disclosure in itself may not achieve much.211 Similar 
reasoning can be extended to risk retention. Since risk retention is to mitigate moral hazard associated with the 
originate-to-distribute model212 , it is arguable if legally requiring risk retention will improve the quality of the 
financial asset itself. This corresponds with my earlier argument about cosmetic approach with rather shallow 
impact of the quality of the underlying financial assets. Lastly, it still unclear if the due diligence requirements 
of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 are remarkably different from the due diligence of other parties in 
securitization, from example trustees. If the due diligence isn’t different, it is most likely to be unnecessary.213 
Sundry Concerns  
The regulation no doubt has some merits in that the new framework repeals existing securitization 
and it limitations. Had the present securitization regulation been flawless, there would not have been 
reason for another. However, the existing body of law namely- Directives 2009/65/EC, 2009/138/EC 
and 2011/61/EU and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 648/2012 also have some good 
provisions. With the new regulation totally repealing the existing one, the good of the present body 
of body of law are somewhat discarded. That is somewhat concerning. In addition, the new 
Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 (and its twin – the Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 – the Securitization 
Prudential Regulation, SPR)214 combine the collaged legislation on securitization. While the former 
emphasizes the introduction of the STS-securitization, the latter replaces the provisions of the Capital 
Requirement Regulation and investment firms. Before the Regulations go live in 2019, what is 
currently obtainable is that the set of rules that applies are dependent on the type of investor. As it is 
                                                          
210 Engelen and Glasmacher (2018) 
211 Schwarcz (2016) 
Some securitization structures are equally complicated that, for example, the sheer amount of 
information to be disclosed or technical financial jargons included in a Prospectus may just make 
investors to rely on credit-rating institutions. 
212 Schwarcz (2016) 
213 Ibid 
214 Both Regulations – (Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 (the Securitization Regulation) and Regulation 
(EU) 2017/2401 (the Securitization Prudential Regulation, or SPR) or expected to work hand-in-hand. 
But this focus of this thesis is essentially on the former. 
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under the new Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 (the Securitization Regulation), all investors are classified 
essentially as institutional investors. Going forward, retail investors can’t, as per the provisions of the 
requirement of the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, engaged in securitization in Europe. Understandably, 
the Regulation is for protection of investors (amongst other things) but outright shutting out of retail 
investors is a concern. 
Another concern about the Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 is the fact that some STS-securitization in 
Europe might profit from favorable capital treatment, while others wouldn’t. It does seem the 
regulation, perhaps unknowingly, is not giving a level playing field. A major instance is the 
application of the eligibility criteria for STS tag. I understand the fact that securitizes are to be 
motivated to get the STS tag, however, the unequal level playing ground is somewhat a legit concern.  
A major instance is the application of the eligibility criteria for STS tag. The criteria are somewhat 
similar for securitization and ABCP transactions. While for securitization, at least, underlying assets 
are expected to have similar characteristics and be homogenous in terms of cash flows nature, 
contracts, and credit risks; for ABCP transactions, the similar criteria are also demanded only that 
there are derogation of the law for specific sector – the auto industry. ABCP transactions are expected 
to have homogenous characteristics, for instance the maturities of underlying assets pool. To be 
considered eligible for the STS tag, ABCP transactions are expected to have pool of asset with the 
remaining weighted average life of not more than a year, and that the with no transactions that may 
have residual maturity of longer than three years. Here is the unfair treatment, the auto industry 
(understandably one of the largest sectors that use the ABCP transaction) has a derogation of the law 
to allow the exposure weighted average of up to three and half years, and provided the underlying 
assets has a residual maturity of longer than six years. In derivatives generally, and securitizations in 
particular, the difference between length of time given to the auto industry can make a lot of difference 
in terms of revenues and turnover. A regulation that unfairly favors some sectors over others can be 
concerning215.  
By way of derogation from the second subparagraph, pools of auto loans, auto leases and equipment 
lease transactions shall have a remaining weighted average life of not more than three and a half 
years, and none of the underlying exposures shall have a residual maturity of more than six years –
Art 24 (15)p3 
Another way to illustrate the unleveled playing field of the regulation is that fact that not all 
securitizations benefit from preferential capital treatment. For instance, Commercial mortgage-
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backed securitization (CMBS) are exempted from the STS eligibility criteria. It seems contradictory 
on many counts, at least to my mind. The reason for the exclusion is exposures and risks concerned 
because there is reliance on the sale of the underlying loans to repay the CMBS obligations. Now, if 
the new Regulations in all about fostering transparency, simplicity and standardization as claimed, 
CMBS with the identified flaws should be those to be included in the STS-securitization eligibility 
criteria and not excluded. This is concerning, to my mind. In the process ‘’ While better capital 
treatment for some products is certainly welcome, it is discouraging that a large number of 
securitizations that have performed historically well (such as some synthetic or more actively 
managed structures) will continue to be disadvantaged relative to more traditional ABS and 
ABCP’’216. There are also other instances of this unfairness217 and there are rather concerning. 
In addition to the above named concerns, it is also noteworthy to mention the third party verification 
and its limitation. As mentioned already, Originator, Sponsor and SSPE may use the service of an 
authorized third party to check whether a securitization complies with the STS criteria. However, the 
use of such a service shall not under any circumstances affect the liability of the Originator, Sponsor 
or SSPE in respect of their legal obligations under the Regulation nor the due-diligence obligations 
imposed on Institutional Investors. This means that, based on the assessment of a third party, the STS 
tag may be given. It is worrying and concerning. It seems to me that the system will potentially work 
like rating agencies. In the wake of the financial crisis, the roles and functions of the rating agencies 
and their culpability is still fresh. Then, rating agencies approved (for whatever reason) sub-primes 
mortgages as prime. Now, after the introduction of the Regulation, same dynamics of third party 
verification can toe the line of the rating agencies and their flawed assessment pre-crisis era.218 
                                                          
216 Norton Rose Fulbright (2018) 
217 ‘’ In its 2015 report to the Commission on synthetic securitization, the European Banking 
Authority (EBA) recognized that synthetic transactions that are used by credit institutions to transfer 
the credit risk of their lending activity off-balance sheet (i.e. balance sheet synthetics) have performed 
relatively well. The EBA recommended extending preferential regulatory capital treatment to senior 
retained tranches of synthetic transactions, provided that specific criteria are satisfied. Among other 
things, the transactions would need to be comprised of fully cash-funded credit protection provided 
by private investors in the form of cash deposited with the originator institution. 
At the time, the Commission was reluctant to introduce eligible STS synthetic products on the basis 
that it lacked sufficient information to take a view. Currently, despite being armed with the EBA’s 
recommendations, the Commission appears to have compromised with the European Parliament on 
this issue. However, the Securitization Regulation does contemplate the possibility of including 
synthetic products in the future’’ - Norton Rose Fulbright (2018) 
 
218 Admittedly, some undertakings are exempted from being third party assessors - Credit institutions, 
investment firms, insurance undertakings and credit rating agencies are not eligible to act as third-
party certification providers.  
74 
 
Another worry is about the legacy assets that are used in securitizations. When Regulation is fully 
operational, the securitization transactions are expected to be STS-securitizations, including legacy 
securitizations, at least in theory. Legacy assets are generally defined as assets that have been on the 
books of companies for a long time and have degenerated value over the time. Some of legacy assets 
are also used in securitizations. Now, here is the concern: from the January 2019 legacy securitization, 
previous legacy transactions can potentially be tagged STS, should they fulfill the criteria. Fulfilling 
criteria doesn’t totally remove what they are! Since the underlying legacy assets are involved, in my 
opinions the exposures are still much as valid as when they are now tagged STS. 
Lastly under the sundry concerns about the Regulation, sanctions may be dissimilar across the EU. It 
is concerning that when the Regulation eventually comes underway, the harmonized set of rules 
would not count as administrative and criminal sanctions regarding the braches of the Regulation will 
be subjected to Member States’ interpretations and peculiarities. For instance, it is possible for a 
similar breach (say for example, the breach of providing wrong data and information), defaulters in 
a particular country could be severely punished than another in a different member state. This is so 
because the use of discretion.  
This so much for a Regulation that wants to harmonize the operations of securitizations across the 
region, particularly with the acclaimed ‘simple, transparent, and standardized’ characteristics. 
Regulation merely expects the sanctions to be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive”. They must 
take into account whether the infringement was intentional or resulting from negligence, and must 
take into account the materiality, gravity and duration of the infringement. While taking into account 
intention or negligence suggests a move away from strict liability for non-compliance, the sanctions 
framework creates a minefield of compliance issues that could discourage cross-border securitization 
and runs contrary to the stated aim of CMU’’219 
  
                                                          
The verification seems worse with the SPR. There are two-fold test or assessment to be carried out. 
‘’ First, the transaction must satisfy a separate set of prudential eligibility criteria. For example, the 
underlying assets must not, on their own, have a risk weighting above a prescribed set of thresholds. 
Second, the transaction must meet further criteria, such as maximum borrower concentrations and 
loan to value limits’’ - Norton Rose Fulbright (2018) 
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7. Conclusion  
The EU, in its green paper on Building a Capital Markets Union220, in February 2015 has listed 
building a sustainable securitization (alongside widening the investor base for SMEs, lowering 
barriers to accessing capital markets, boosting long term investment, developing European private 
placement markets) as one of the priorities for early action in terms of its resolve for reawakening 
economic vibrancy in Europe. It defines securitization as ‘the process by which assets such as 
mortgages are pooled together for the investors to invest in’ and this paper examines the evolution of 
the securitization in Europe, the current summary of EU legal acts that deal with securitization 
(essentially the CRR iv), it potentials and present problems, as well as the panacea for its current 
impairment after the financial crisis. 
When structured and applied well, Securitization has enormous economic and social benefits. A well-
structured and functioning securitization market help as an investment avenue for financial 
institutions and investors. It is also a viable funding instrument to foster lending to banks and other 
investors. Securitization also acts as a medium to generate collateral for credit demands, by its ability 
to transform illiquid receivables and loans to more liquid assets. However, following the financial 
crisis, and the role played by securitization, there is still a lot of stigma associated with securitization. 
In response to the financial crisis, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 
at the end of 2017, passed the general framework for securitization in Europe. The frame work entails 
elevating the process of securitization to be transparent, simple, and standardized.221 The regulation, 
coming into force by 2019, also doubles as an amendment to Directives 2009/65/EC, 2009/138/EC 
and 2011/61/EU and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 648/2012.  
The crux of the regulatory response in Europe is to incentivize people to participate more in 
securitization, especially opening up the process to be simpler and transparent. The European 
Parliament and Council proposed the framework that eventually culminates to the Regulations (EU) 
2017/2402 and 2017/2401. The former relates to the securitization regulation in itself while the latter 
relates to the amendments in the existing capital requirement regulation. On a global scale, there are 
also coordinated efforts to strengthen securitization. 
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The acronym STS is duped for the securitization that will be simple, transparent and standardized, 
Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 
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The Regulation 2017/2402 essential contains two divisions – the general framework and specific 
requirements for the criteria for securitizations that are simple, transparent, and standardized. The 
general framework includes requirements like due diligence, risk retention, and transparency. 
Due Diligence requires institutional investors to verify certain components of the securitization 
transaction, prior to holding a securitization position. The crucial elements include the credit-granting 
process of the originator222, the adherence and compliance of the originator to risk retention 
requirements, regular provision of required information by the originator, and the risk characteristic 
and structural traits that are to be in accordance to written processes, both to be initially written and 
those to be added on ongoing basis. If the originator or the original lender is not a firm established in 
the European Union, the due diligence is perhaps more pronounced as the credit-granting process as 
to be sure to be in compliance with ‘sound and well-defined criteria’ of creditworthiness, and effective 
credit financing systems. It also expects thorough assessment of the risk profile of the securitization 
positions to be held, regardless if such securitizations are supported with the ABCP Programme or 
otherwise, particularly as it affects the underlying exposures. The due diligence requirement of the 
institutional investor is obviously an encouraging, novel addition. However, apart from the fact that 
due diligence is an additional burden on the institutional investor, it is yet to be seen if it changes 
anything remarkably, as the due diligence requirement is not essentially different from due diligence 
of other parties, (say for example the trustees) in a securitization transaction.  
The general framework also requires expects the interests of the originator, the original lender or the 
sponsor align with those of the institutional investor. To therefore attain this, the Sponsor, Originator, 
or the Original Lender is expected to retain significant net economic interest in the securitization on 
an ongoing basis. This is the risk retention aspect of the regulation. It essentially captures the 
reduction of the moral hazard involved in the originate-to-distribute model of securitization. The net 
material economic interest is not expected to be less than 5% of the notional value of the origination, 
for off-balance sheet items. Of course, to reflect the true state of the value, the net economic interest 
is not supposed to be subject to hedging, or any credit-risk mitigation. It is only one party that is 
expected to have the risk retention. In the event that it turns out that there is no agreement on the basis 
for risk retention, the originator then is obligated to fulfil all the risk retention requirement. That way, 
there would not be a split that could potential reduce the actual risk retention percentage of the net 
economic interest. In addition, to safeguarding that there no split, there isn’t supposed to be any 
multiple applications for the retention requirement. Entities that are created or that operate in 
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securitizing exposures wouldn’t be qualified to be originator. These requirements seem to be clearly 
thought-out ones by the drafters. In securitization transactions, risk retention can be hugely avoided 
with many technical procedures – some of which the Regulation frowns out: Split and multiple 
applications.  
Transparency part of the general framework hopes to forestall a reoccurrence of the events of the 
global financial crisis, by having a higher sense of transparency and information sharing on the part 
of the originator, Sponsor, SSPE etc to the institutional investors.  The originator, sponsor or the 
SSPE are obligated to provide the institutional investors (even before concluding and holding the 
securitization position) on a regular basis with sufficient information that are material for the 
informed decision of holding the securitization position. The frequency of the information may vary 
depending on the types and class of the securitization. For example details about the underlying 
exposures and documentations223 are vital enough to be provided to the investors, and they are to be 
provided on a quarterly basis. Fine line and details are not to be left-out, say for example, information 
about the description of the payment priority. The information sharing is expected to be compact, and 
comprehensive, as the originator, sponsor, and SSPE make available the information through a 
securitization repository.  
The specific framework of the Regulation relates to the criteria for the simple, transparency and 
standardized tag. To be simple, the title to the underlying exposures is only to be acquired by the 
means of true sale or assignment or transfer with the same legal effect in the manner that is 
enforceable against the seller or any other third. That way, complicated ownership structure are 
avoided. Plus, In addition, the assets are to be homogenous in nature and no resecuritization is 
allowed. To be transparent, the inner workings of securitization is opened up, and information sharing 
is encouraged. Investors are to be avail information for them to make informed decision about the 
securitization transaction. The requirement makes sure that at least 5 years of data to be made 
available. The standardization phase of the STS criteria bothers on structural elements. It requires that 
                                                          
223 Important documentations like the final offering document or the prospectus together with the 
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78 
 
the risk retention part of the Regulation must be adhered to by the originator, and sponsor. It also 
expects that the currency risks and interest risks by mitigated. In all to be standardized, there will be 
elements of comparability across board.   
Welcoming as the Regulation may seem, there are concerns. The thesis categorizes these concerns 
into two – difference between the narratives and contents, and sundry concerns. Under the sundry 
concerns, the thesis identifies potential implications and differences that will occur in the European 
Securitization Market, going-forward by January 2019. Under the discrepancy concerns, the thesis 
identifies ways that the narratives about the STS-securitization are slightly different from the realities 
that will take place.  
Regardless of the regulatory interventions up till date, the securitization in Europe is still 
underachieving compared to the US securitization. Specifically, the Regulation seems to deal with 
the ‘quantity’ instead of ‘quality’ of securitization. For example, STS-securitization deals with the 
process of how securitization is carried out with the reference to the tranching, structuring, 
distribution, and rating) but little or nothing is done with the ‘quality’ of the securitization in terms 
of laws concerning the structure of the underlying assets. It is worrying that that the Regulation has 
limited impact on the mortgage contracts themselves, since securitization is largely in form of 
derivatives hinged on an underlying assets. In addition, the Regulation seems to structurally favour 
investors over other parties in a securitization transaction, apart from the fact that the rules in the 
Regulation are not as simple as the title suggests. All in all, the landscape of European securitization 
market will change from 2019. Time only can tell if the Regulation 2017/2402 can make the 
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